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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF

WOLFGANG MENZEL.

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THE simultaneous translation in England and in America of WOLFGANG MENZEL'S "German Literature," is the best proof of the general estimation in which the author is held; and though the peculiar character, and the ephemeral title, of the following work, might be supposed to preclude its reception in this country, its value will be duly appreciated by those who have reflected on the past history of the world, and desire to trace, in the sentiments and expressions of our neighbours, the signs of coming events. Elicited in some measure by another

and hostile production; written in a style of argument which appears occasionally to deviate from strict logic; and addressed solely to Germans, with the patriotic intention of warning them against the evils of disunion,—British concerns obtain merely incidental notice. Yet it is unnecessary to point out how closely the welfare of England is associated with the political security of Germany: nor, in the present menacing aspect of Europe, can a slight importance be attached to the opinions of enlightened foreigners, regarding those national feelings and interests on which chiefly depend the cessation or the maintenance of Peace.

To the benevolent individuals who look forward to an era of happiness and con-

tentment,—or to that class who imagine the possibility of Britannic isolation, in modern times, as when our shores were first invaded by Cæsar,—an exposition of foreign views on European policy will hold out slender attractions. The author encourages no such visionaries. With respect to Germany in particular, his brightest hopes are saddened by many gloomy forebodings. While dwelling, with Teutonic confidence, on her commercial and social prospects, he entertains a most anxious dread of impending calamities.

It is proper to observe that the “Commercial League,” so frequently mentioned, and in high terms of approval, is what is otherwise denominated the “Prussian Union of the Customs.”

Of the translation itself it may suffice to add, that, for the purpose of avoiding ambiguity, "Germany" and "Germans" have been substituted where the first person had been employed in the original.

February 1841.

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THE “
EUROPEAN PENTARCHY.

It may be necessary to inform the English reader, that the original, of which a translation is now offered, had been preceded by a treatise published at Leipsic, under the title of “The European Pentarchy”; a work written by some partisan of Russia, with the view of sowing dissensions among the German States, and conciliating favour to Russian encroachment. As will soon be perceived, the following inquiry was undertaken with no such object.

In speaking of the GREAT POWERS of Europe, the first question is, what do we properly understand

by the term *political power* ! That term cannot at the present day be confined to Dynasties and Governments. There must be other powers to which Dynasties and Governments are indebted for the strength they have attained ; powers occasionally threatening them not only from without but also from within. Not unfrequently these powers have become so mighty that, overthrowing ancient states and kingdoms, and introducing others in their stead, they have carried Europe along as by a hurricane, and have created entirely new interests. We recognise as such powers, the power of NATIONALITY ; the power of RELIGIOUS OPINION ; the power of POLITICAL PRINCIPLES ; and the power of MATERIAL INTERESTS. These are the great powers of our day, which, intimately conjoined with the power of existing DYNASTIES AND GOVERNMENTS, form the proper Pentarchy of Europe. The power of *skill* and *science* does not here come particularly under consideration ; because that power serves only to exalt national renown, to increase or lessen the power of religious opinion, and of political principles, and through a knowledge of nature to advance Material Interests ; besides, the power

of skill and science is comprehended in all the others.

The power of NATIONALITY displayed itself earliest. From the collision of migratory tribes in quest of settlements, arose that territorial arrangement of Europe, which has continued to the present day; notwithstanding the many shocks it has undergone, and the liability in the course of years to be superseded by other lines of demarcation. However often nations may have been parcelled out among many native and foreign masters, and however often nations may have been united under the rule of one; still in every instance it will be found that each nation has retained its peculiar character, its native language, its several customs, and local interests; these interests in the progress of time again acquiring more or less influence. The natural force with which nationality is combined baffles all attempts at alteration. Imperceptibly, obtrusive modes are dislodged. Thus German habits in Italy were supplanted by the old Romanic; and Italian manners, once prevalent in Germany, were extinguished by the Reformation.

In other cases, existing Dynasties and Governments have judiciously availed themselves of the power of Nationality to strengthen their position, or to repel foreign attacks. Napoleon triumphed by exciting the enthusiasm of the so-called Great Nation, and was overthrown by the recoil of national feeling in Europe. Even the weakest and most severely depressed nations have imbibed courage from the indestructible vigour of nationality, which has excited them to make wonderful efforts, at times successful, at times unsuccessful, to effect their regeneration : witness latterly the deeds of the Poles and of the modern Greeks.

The power of RELIGIOUS OPINION, comprehending the power of an established CHURCH, is the second in regard to antiquity. This power first encroached on national frontiers, shattered native sovereignties, and from their ruins formed new states and dynasties, of which not a few arose on the decline of the Papal power. All the states whose integrity was guaranteed by the peace of Westphalia, were either the residue of the old sovereignties ; as the dominions of the House of Haps-

burg, the French, Spanish, English, Swedish, Danish, and Polish kingdoms; or had emancipated themselves. *first*, as the states of the German Electors, Savoy, and Switzerland, in the war of Investitures, which was the earliest diminution of the strength of the Empire; *secondly*, as Holland, which owed its emancipation at a later period to the great wars of the Reformation. Excess of enthusiasm in religion, is invariably followed by religious indifference. But the Power of Religious Opinion has never been, and never can be, extinguished; so deeply is it rooted in the feelings of mankind. It may rise above and sink beneath the level, but to the level it ever returns; and as no one in our day can fail to know, continues fully as much as Nationality, to be one of the great moving powers in Europe.

The power of POLITICAL PRINCIPLES, and the power of MATERIAL INTERESTS, arose almost simultaneously during the great struggle of the Reformation. These powers first introduced into the world that spirit of innovation which humbled the Romish Church; though at the beginning

both these powers were employed by the religious parties as mere instruments. The powers which thus served as instruments, were soon dispensed with and laid aside, when the object in view was attained. The Catholics engaging in conflict with the new reformed party, and requiring, not only spiritual, but worldly force, adopted as their political creed the principle of absolute monarchy; against which the Reformers set up Republicanism as an antidote. Afterwards, on both sides, men became more tolerant as regards religion; but the adverse principles remaining in full force, by degrees expanded themselves, and in more recent times have, on the ground of right, laid claim to the supremacy of Europe. About the same period, what are termed the Material Interests first began to assume importance. The religious wars demanded immense exertions; money was wanted; and necessity, even in Spain, fostered the improvement of navigation and commerce, notwithstanding the general indolence of that country. In fact, maritime ardour may be said to have disappeared in Spain as the religious wars died away. But the Reformers, especially the Dutch,

who were certainly the most inveterate, perhaps the most personal adversaries of the Spaniards, during the heat of the war, had appropriated to themselves, and were better able to wield, the weapons supplied by navigation and commerce. The example of Holland proves most clearly that both the power of **POLITICAL PRINCIPLES**, and the power of **MATERIAL INTERESTS**, sprang from one and the same origin. These last named powers were long concentrated in the Dutch Republic, and, while the rest of Europe lay torpid, were the cause of its astonishing prosperity. But in the course of time Holland became too limited a stage. The power of political principle withdrew to France, while the power of material interests settled in England.

Freedom, which, viewed as a principle, had been at the era of the Reformation merely the means to an end, and in subserviency to a religious party; became self-existent, and recognised by its own title, powerful, nay, at the French Revolution, overpowering. After an arduous struggle this power could be overcome only by a combination

of all the other powers ; a combination of nationality, of religious opinion, and of material interests ; and it would perhaps have been still more difficult to subdue, had not freedom been betrayed by the great son of the Revolution himself. In this instance, too, enthusiasm was followed by indifference. But who that lived to witness the tempest can yet doubt the extensive power of the principle of freedom ?

By the revolutionary contest, as by the war of religion, the divisions of Europe and the relations of dynasties and states were again altered. Many small states disappeared ; some large states became still larger ; a new dynasty reared itself in Sweden ; through the constitutional system, or through hostility to it, the old states were animated with new life ; Germany, in particular, having ceased to be an empire, assumed a quite different physiognomy. Since the treaty of peace, the conflict of principles has continued in detail, producing new relations, a kingdom in Belgium, and important changes in France, Spain, and Portugal.

Nevertheless the power of *political principles* was proportionally weakened, and their effects were no longer the same as fifty years before ; the power of *material interests* the more decidedly gaining the ascendant. England, during the revolutionary war, had leant chiefly on this power, to which she owes her enormous preponderance in the European scale. England was regarded with envy or with the imitative instinct of poverty. Peace favoured the material interests : everywhere people longed for calm that their voices might be heard ; especially in Germany, which had suffered most by interruptions of trade. In France alone the question of political principles has been invariably preferred to that of material interests ; though the present dynasty, in opposition to the republican party, has attached itself to the material interests as to an anchor. France has vainly sought in industry and commerce to forget political reasoning. The other countries of Europe promoted their material interests in proportion to the tranquillity they enjoyed ; though too often with the characteristic selfishness of a former age, which, by encouraging native industry, and prohibitions against articles of foreign

manufacture, deprives the country itself of much internal benefit, without warranting any greater advantage abroad. But in general the power of material interest is, of all others, in our day, the least misapprehended ; it even animates poetical fancy, and excites visionaries of every kind, among whom the St Simonians are most conspicuous.

The character of the **DYNASTIES** and **GOVERNMENTS** composing the fifth great power in Europe, is thus, necessarily, imparted by the four great powers already named. Whatever country in our day is powerful, derives its power from the energy, the vitality, the recollections and the hopes, the renown and the ambition of the people ;—from religious sympathies, sincere piety, and constancy in belief, and from the still active interests of church parties ;—from the strength of principle, and the firm resolves of political associations ;—or from the advancement of material interests, along with the wellbeing and activity of the working-classes ;—or, lastly, from several, or from all these sources of power combined.

But much depends on how far, within any country, these powers are not in opposition to each other; and to what extent the government is at liberty to employ them,—and, further, what is the degree of external sympathy and antipathy toward that country; what natural allies or natural enemies there are abroad. Only according to these circumstances can the true power of a country be estimated. Several appear to have many means at their command, but cannot freely employ them; others can employ their means freely, and are in reality powerful, but are thwarted by greater antipathies from without.

Moreover, in every country at present, the governments alone wield the *initiative*. Risings of whole nations, or of great religious sects, violent outbreaks of political parties in favour of a principle, without regard to existing states, are very improbable events. Even if these national and religious questions, and questions of political principle, were to attain a European importance, they would immediately be converted by the governments into questions of interest; and would go to form ad-

ditional weight in the European scale ; or some government, more fortunate and more prudent than the rest, would appropriate all the advantages the increase and the triumph of a party would ensure.

Thus, without overlooking the fact, that European Governments derive their power from very different, and not always from permanent sources, still in them we behold the manifest possessors, and the outward representatives, of every thing which is denominated power.

From this point of view we shall now proceed to consider more closely the sources of power in European nations ; and while endeavouring to reduce power to its true value, and to weigh the individual powers against each other, we shall perhaps be in a condition to elucidate some particulars which seem to have received less than their due attention from our contemporaries.

ENGLAND.

Not without cause is the name of England here placed first. Russia, perhaps, might have claimed precedence on the ground of her colossal military force, were it not counterbalanced by antipathies and interests which are not equally available against England. A great and manifest advantage to England is, that she cannot excite apprehensions by the supposed desire of possessing territory on the Continent, and by these means establishing a universal monarchy. This circumstance at once secures to England permanent sympathies and alliances among Continental nations.

But even by herself England is great in every respect ; her power being derived from all the sources from which the power of a state can flow.

England has preserved the strength, the consciousness, the pride of her NATIONALITY ; no part of which has been lost, even by the constrained acknowledgment of the independence of the United States. It is a proud boast, and an infallible proof of her national vitality, to have impressed on her conquests and colonies the stamp of the English character ; that the children and the grandchildren should resemble their original parent, in no way degenerated ; in the New, as in the Old World, exhibiting the same vigour and manliness. From a hardy stem only could such healthy shoots have been put forth. What other people can point to similar conquests and colonies, while in its native soil the old stem flourishes with undecaying youth ? Although there are other European nations who vie with England in national pride ; yet in this respect the English maintain the superiority, that they not only evince that pride externally, by carrying on their wars with the energy of national wars ; but even in peace, and in ordinary civil life, they always continue mindful of the high tone and honourable feeling that becomes a free and a noble nation.

RELIGION also exercises great influence on the English character. At an early period England adopted the Reformation, purchased it at a far smaller sacrifice than Germany, and enjoyed from it many greater advantages. Strict morals, manly devotion, and true piety, originally belonged to the native character of the English ; but these qualities were disciplined, and gained more strength from the Reformation. The Catholic opposition in Ireland never was, is not even now, and never will become dangerous, so long as the reformed party continue firm ; and yet, in accordance with the humane spirit of the age, secure toleration and equality of rights. Still less has England to dread from an irreligious opposition, such as was, and still is, to be deprecated in France.

The unceasing contest of POLITICAL PRINCIPLES, which has caused so much injury to other nations, has been to England entirely beneficial. It has long been remarked that England combines within herself the virtues of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy ; while in other states these political principles are at variance, and reciprocally weaken

each other. The practical sense of the English soon recovers itself; they have for centuries undeviatingly upheld the equilibrium, the mutual support, and the gradation of the component parts of the state; always advancing and improving; always watchful; never subversive, or supine. Hence the English are far ahead of every other people in political information, and in political tact; nor are the latest efforts of Radicalism to undermine the fabric of the government, to be at all compared with similar attempts in France. In England the tendency is different; and the chances are, that, should Radicalism ever reach a crisis, the English legislature would not be revolutionized, only further reformed. In England, unworthy and noxious elements are rejected, but no disorganization ensues. The oak shakes off the withered leaves of autumn, while the roots hold fast.

The Russian pamphleteer has, in his "European Pentarchy," expressed the hope that England would be undermined by Radicalism, and through internal distraction externally weakened. But he ought to have recollected the English revolution in

the 17th century; which, though horrors of every kind were provoked, yet at the same time rendered the kingdom more powerful at home, strengthened the British influence abroad, and raised the navy of England to a superiority never before attainable. The navigation act, that *habeas corpus* of the sea, was the work of Cromwell, and a creation of Radicalism.

While England steadily maintains freedom, and advocates reform within the bounds of moderation and lawful order; she preserves to herself not only her own peculiar strength unimpaired, never exhausting itself nor relaxing into sloth; but she secures very valuable and, if need be, inestimable sympathies on the Continent. However justly the Tories may be blamed; abroad it is never doubted that England would finally take up arms on the side of freedom. Such is the firm belief on the Continent; nor is the belief unsettled even by actual disappointments. Whenever England may offer her assistance against any sort of tyranny, she will be implicitly relied on for support. Yet England herself is not revolutionary, and by her own inter-

nal tranquillity and well-known moderation inspires the Continental governments with confidence. England has thus an inexhaustible stock of political sympathies and alliances at command. A case where she would be without allies on the Continent, is inconceivable. The marvellous efforts of Napoleon were rendered abortive ; even he only proved the constancy of foreign sympathies for England, while vainly straining every nerve to subdue her.

Lastly, by attention to her MATERIAL INTERESTS, England has made herself the richest country in the world ; and notwithstanding the fictitious national debt, has a command of money to an extent beyond that of any other state. In asserting the dominion of the sea, and, by direct as well as indirect means, enforcing a monopoly of trade ; she has, no doubt, often wronged the nations of the Continent, deeply mortified and injured them in their most essential rights and interests ; but the antipathies awakened by such conduct do not in general outweigh the sympathies in her favour. The jealousy existing among the Continental powers, and the necessity of an alliance with England in

every great political crisis, prevails against the feeling of commercial indignity.*

Without dispute Great Britain is very powerful; relatively, the most powerful kingdom in Europe. From having no inclination or aptitude for Continental conquests, her European policy is limited to preventing the formation of any rival maritime power in her neighbourhood; to securing the great market of the Continent for her colonial produce and manufactured goods; and to opening a passage by the Mediterranean through Egypt or Syria toward her East Indian possessions. On the first head she has almost nothing to fear. No European fleet, or combination of fleets, could successfully oppose England at sea. As to the second point, it has long been the policy of England to prevent any Continental nation from monopolizing, to the same extent as herself, the Atlantic colonial trade, and making the transit of produce through England unnecessary: in this endeavour she has succeeded admirably with Spain, Portugal, Holland, and

* A verse of displeasure not to be reprehended in a chapter so laudatory.—Tr.

France. It has also been part of the English system to maintain what is called the balance of power in Europe ; so that no state on the Continent may swallow up all the rest, and, like France under Napoleon, renew the famed Continental League. On these grounds England was Napoleon's most active antagonist, and would be no less hostile to Russia, were a universal European monarchy to be apprehended from that quarter. With regard to the third point, it is clearly the interest of England, that in the Levant, where she seeks a passage to India, no great power should be allowed to establish itself: consequently, that neither Russia should predominate there, nor Mehemet Ali succeed in reviving the caliphate.

England might indeed make a division with Russia. But it does not in the least degree suit the interests of Russia to open for the English an overland route to India. And still less does it accord with the interests of England to gain her object by conniving at any usurpation on the part of Russia. Any division of Turkey affording an increase of territory to Russia, would only enable the Czar

the more effectually to throw obstacles in the way of the proposed overland route to India. This route would lose incalculably in security the nearer it is approached by the Russian frontier ; and the foregoing this route for the present, is of much less importance to England than gaining it at the price of Russian aggrandizement.

On this account all compacts between England and Russia only tend to prolong the provisional state of the East ; but can never result in any dismemberment of Turkey.

England beholding in Russia the most effective obstacle to her Eastern plans, counteracts Russian craft in many ways. Standing at the head of the Holy Alliance, Russia enforces in Europe absolutism and legitimacy. Against that alliance England formed the Quadruple Alliance of the constitutional and liberal states of the West : principle is thus ranged against principle. Perhaps England would also have espoused the cause of Poland against Russia, had not circumspection been required in dealing with the other Continental

powers ; nor, under the circumstances, was there a prospect of successful interference. But England has been indefatigable and most successful when she stirred up the question of the European equilibrium ; of that equilibrium which does not permit all the great powers of the Continent to desire an aggrandizement of Russia.

England has thus the good fortune to preserve friendly relations with all the Continental powers except Russia. Spain and Portugal depend on her for support. The Scandinavian peninsula is too weak, and too much overshadowed by Russia, to regard with jealousy the maritime predominance of England. Political unanimity, the position of the reigning family, and lastly the wish to maintain Algiers, binds France to England. Austria is the natural and oldest ally of England on the Continent. A kindred necessity secures the friendship of Prussia and the rest of Germany ; though the Commercial League (Zoll-verein) is contrary to the interests of England.*

* Or in Germany is imagined so to be.—Tr.

While Russia continues overpowerful, or seeks to extend her conquests, these friendly relations will not be weakened. The duration of the sympathy with France alone appears problematical. Should the French, in the course of time, lay aside the hope of renewing, by revolutionary means, their former glory and imperial grandeur; should they become attached to monarchy; then would France revert to the old cabinet policy of Louis XIV., and endeavour, by Russian aid, to reunite to her territory the left bank of the Rhine,—a result not to be gained by any alliance with England.

R U S S I A.

THE power of Russia, though undoubtedly great, has often been exaggerated by flatterers. So long as war lasts, exaggeration may serve to alarm opponents; but it is otherwise during peace, when there is time for reflection. Russia would in reality be what she only appears, the most formidable state in Europe, had she not awakened so many antipathies against herself, partly by awkward artifices to gain sympathy. Russia, properly, has no natural allies except, in certain events, the conditional alliance of France.

Still the power is enormous which Russia summons forth from her own resources. The basis of her power is NATIONAL FEELING, so much the stronger from being somewhat barbarous. The

Russians are numerous, united, blindly devoted to the Czar, faithful and obedient in peace, patient and courageous in war.

The Russians also, without any political information, enjoy the first and greatest prerogative a nation can possess,—unity and external independence. No Russian ever dreams of breaking Russia asunder. Revolutions in the palace do not dissolve the integrity of the empire. Civil wars and foreign tyranny, so frequent and so baneful to more enlightened countries, have for many generations been unfelt by the Russians. On the contrary, they have learned to look upon themselves as the masters of the surrounding nations. One thing only is wanting to the Russian people, moral strength ; the capacity of displaying superiority of intellect, and not of the mere physical mass. Therefore is Russia destitute of all sympathy abroad. More polished nations revolt from the idea of being subjected to the sway of Russia ; and even the barbarians of the Caucasus, personally confronted with the Russians, are not overcome by that higher intelligence and feeling which in ancient times their forefathers ad-

mired in the soldiery of Alexander the Great. This mental deficiency is what has rendered impossible the conciliation of the Poles, though a people of kindred origin. From the same cause arises a latent weakness throughout the Russian army, which not unfrequently has marred their courage and devotedness, even when engaged with much less numerous antagonists.

Among the native Russians, both in the military and civil service, a jealousy of foreigners has recently displayed itself, which must undoubtedly be considered among the weaknesses of the Russian monarchy, and a great political folly on the part of the Russians. Whether the generals and high officers of state have been born in Russia itself, or are Germans, Frenchmen, Poles, matters not; if they have faithfully and more skillfully forwarded the interests of Russia. That such has been the case, they have proved. A Russian ought not to complain, but be proud, that foreigners have served Russia. Does a German who enters the Russian service thereby benefit his native country? Rather the reverse. Ostermann and Munich

were Germans. Catharine the Second herself was a German. And did they not do their utmost to make Russia great and powerful? did they not, on account of Russia, leave their native Germany quite out of view? Has Germany cause to be proud of such disloyal children? Not Germany, but Russia alone. How much value did Napoleon justly attach to the employment of talented men of all countries? And how large a portion of the successes of France were owing to strangers? The case is similar in Russia. It must be further borne in mind, that the Slavonic population in the Russian empire is not homogeneous. An assimilation, for example, of the Poles with the Russians is not the work of a day, or to be effected by an Ukase. Who then cannot, under these circumstances, perceive that it becomes most desirable for Russia to employ against the Poles, not Russians only, but foreigners likewise, in order to neutralize the hatred against the Russian nation by the greatest possible mixture of other nations? Besides, the Russomania which would exclude from their service every thing that is not of Russian birth, is in a manner a protestation against conquest, and in

direct contradiction to the system of aggrandizement.

The power of RELIGION is the second stronghold of Russia. The Czar is at the same time Patriarch ; the supremacy of the Church and the State being conjoined. The popes, as the priesthood are termed, far from exhibiting any aristocratic pretensions, are under absolute subjection to the emperor. In Russia, it would never enter the imagination of a dignitary of the church to resist the power of the sovereign, like the Archbishops of Cologne and Posen. And as to learned theologians qualified to excite schisms, or lead astray to infidelity by vain sophisms ; of such men there are none in the Greek Church. The people are passively devout, believe what their priests tell them, enter into no inquiries or reasonings, and implicitly regard the will of the emperor as the will of the Almighty. In one respect only, the Greek Church in Russia, like the nation, is deficient ; it has no ability to excite respect, or awaken sympathy abroad ; at the utmost, it exerts a feeble influence over those of the same creed in southern countries not Russian.

Russia owes to her **POLITICAL PRINCIPLES** a portion of her excessive power. Russia is the only state which upholds an unlimited autocracy; and within whose vast dominions one man rules uncontrolled by opposition, nay without even the remonstrance of a single deliberative body. All her means are brought to a point, and ready for immediate application. The geographical extent of Russia alone retards the execution of an imperial mandate. Necessarily, from the adherence of Russia to the principles of legitimacy and absolutism; all other governments who adopt the same principle, but of themselves cannot, without much trouble and danger, maintain it outright; and who, on that account, require external aid and support; become the friends, and relatively the clients of Russia. When such governments are molested by outbreaks of popular feeling, they have recourse to Russian diplomacy and intervention; and if the worst happen, they know a secure retreat is to be found in Russia. Accordingly, Russia appears to have many natural allies. But principle yields to interest; and the same governments who, in regard to absolutism, most nearly coincide with Russia, have

an interest adverse to her, as neighbours ; so far as they are strong enough, like Austria and Prussia, being natural rivals of Russia ; while the countries notoriously more feeble are afraid of losing, by Russian agency, their national existence. On the contrary, France has, indeed, many interests in common with Russia ; among others, to weaken the states of Germany ; but in France the Constitutional, almost the Democratic, principle predominates, the very principle of all others most opposed to that upheld by Russia. Consequently, Russia derives every possible internal advantage from her form of government, but externally none whatever. Governments agreeing in opinion sympathize cautiously with Russia, and always retain their peculiar interests in reserve ; while the people of Europe, enjoying, even under absolute monarchies, greater freedom than Russia, view her principles with dislike.

The Russian government most zealously forwards the MATERIAL INTERESTS of their own country ; but only in so far as suits their prohibitive system, in regard to foreign articles. For this

reason they still cling to the old maxims of trade; and, perhaps, in Russia, which of itself affords so large a market, these maxims may be more applicable than in smaller countries; besides, the consumption among the mass of the Russian people, is different from that in countries possessing a numerous and intelligent middle class of society. Meanwhile the exclusive system of Russia operates prejudicially on her external relations; keeping alive in the neighbouring states a strong feeling against her. An opinion, indeed, has been artfully expressed, that by her heavy imposts, Russia has prevailed on some of her Baltic neighbours to desire a union with that empire; for were they to become Russian subjects, a larger market would at once be opened to them. But Providence perhaps designs otherwise; and enlivens the harbour of Dantzic under more favourable auspices.

Certainly, however, Russia is striving for a wide extension of her commerce in the Mediterranean; the possession of the Dardanelles being not less necessary for the advancement of her material interests, than on military and political consider-

ations. So long as she is not in possession of the Dardanelles, as the Emperor Alexander was wont to say, Russia holds not the key of her own house.

Having thus made ourselves acquainted with the sources of the power of Russia within her own territory, we shall now survey her external relations; the means she has at her command in other quarters; and likewise the obstacles to the further extension of her power. We must premise that Russia, though very successful in Asia, has never yet, by herself alone, made any conquests or acquisitions in Europe. There, every increase of her territory has been gained by alliances. It may also not be superfluous to remark, that the Russian armies, unless combined with other troops, have always failed in their encounters with an enemy of equal force; though victorious, it is true, over opponents much weaker than themselves: to this fact the celebrated campaign of Suwarrow in Italy is a solitary exception. What has just been mentioned, proves that the influence and extensive encroachments of Russia in Europe, have been owing

altogether to the dexterous use of the alliances she has made from time to time.

When the military armaments of Russia are so often represented as invincible, and as the means of establishing a future universal monarchy, we ought to bear in mind, and pointedly to notice, that Russia is indebted for her victories at Pultowa, and in the winter of 1812, not so much to generalship as to the climate; that her victories over the Tartars, Persians, and Turks, and over Sweden in 1809, are due only to her overwhelming superiority and to the imbecility and corruption of her foes; that her successes against Poland were in consequence of the weakness of the Poles themselves, and the behaviour of the adjoining states; that she has to thank her allies for the victory at Kunersdorff, and the overthrow of Napoleon in 1813 and 1814;—that, on the other hand, when she has stood alone, or with feeble allies, she has always, except under Suwarrow, been defeated by inferior numbers of the regular troops of Western Europe. The Russians were routed by Charles the Twelfth and Frederick the Great with very

limited resources. They were beaten at Zurich and Austerlitz, at Friedland, (on the Moskwa) at Borodino ; nay, even in the last Polish war, till the way by Thorn was opened to them. If the great Continental powers be unfit singly to cope with Russia, any two of them would most assuredly be more than her match. The formidable character of Russia will thus bear some modification. There cannot be an apprehension of the military strength, or of the peculiar ability, of Russia ; but only a fear of her allies,—a fear of being circumvented by that insidious diplomacy with which Russia on all occasions endeavours to create dissensions in Europe.

By these means Russia won every thing she has got hold of in Europe beyond her natural limits. And, in truth, she at one time encouraged the quarrels of other great powers, and while they were struggling for life or death, she quietly seized upon the weaker states ; at another time joining in a formal alliance, she plundered or partitioned out some defenceless territory. For the most part, both these plans were pursued simultaneously. The power with which she was in alliance, she kept well

occupied elsewhere: not unfrequently she waited till an ally was entangled in some difficulty, and then, as being on the spot, took to herself the lion's share. In this way, while Austria was involved in the war of the Spanish succession, she, with the aid of the Prussians, Danes, and Saxons, seized the German provinces on the Baltic. In the same way, with the help of Austria and Prussia, she made the first partition of Poland in 1773. Similarly, she obtained the largest share at the second partition in 1794, while Austria and Prussia were intent on the movements of France. Again, she burst into the Crimea when Austria was engaged with the Netherlands, and Prussia was at variance with Holland. She took possession of Finland, with the concurrence of Napoleon, when busied in Spain. Under the same auspices, parts of Polish Prussia and Galicia were appropriated, when Austria and Prussia were much cast down.

Thus, of the once-powerful neighbours of Russia, some have been blotted out of the roll of nations, others completely exhausted. Poland, in regard to her political existence, is annihilated. Swe-

den, the bulwark of the Protestant faith, mourns the loss of her Baltic provinces and Finland. The Porte, so formidable of yore, has yielded to Russia the Crimea, Bessarabia, and the embouchure of the Danube; to which may now be added Moldavia and Wallachia. The first barrier of surrounding states has been laid low by Russia, and has crumbled away. Will it be indispensable for the next barrier, which, besides what is left of the old Swedish and Turkish realms, comprises Austria and Prussia, to arm against a similar fate? or has the hitherto conquering policy of Russia suddenly veered, and henceforward will her thoughts be directed only to security and peace? Is she never again to dare an enlargement of her territorial possessions in the West?

The Russian pamphleteer endeavours, in his "European Pentarchy," to raise an impression that Russia is not anxious for the possession of the Dardanelles, nor for the conquest of Constantinople. He says, "I cannot deny that it has always cost me the greatest effort to discover any ground in the least degree tenable, or a single object cal-

“culated to produce a real advantage, which might
“influence Russia to desire to become the joint
“or sole heir of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.
“It is quite incomprehensible how men, in judg-
“ing of Russian and Turkish affairs, have so total-
“ly neglected to pay any attention to the northern
“parallel; whether the Baltic and the Black Sea,
“Copenhagen and Constantinople, the Sound and
“the Bosphorus, Cronstadt and the Castles of the
“Dardanelles, present relations in every way cor-
“responding with each other. One may also go
“yet further, and maintain that England, were she
“to interrupt the free passage of Russia through
“the Sound, would constrain Russia to take pos-
“session of harbours on the German Ocean; so also,
“were she to prevent Russia from taking posses-
“sion of the Caucasian Isthmus, she would incite
“the Czar to occupy Constantinople (!!) Denmark
“is a state as weak, and compounded of as
“heterogeneous parts, as the Ottoman Empire; and
“for that reason can, like the Ottoman Empire,
“maintain and secure her individual existence only
“by confederacies and alliances. And yet no one
“has gone the length of inserting among news-

“ paper falsehoods, the discovery of a secret design
“ of Russia to conquer Zealand and the Danish
“ Archipelago ; albeit such a novel report might,
“ notwithstanding its absurdity, have been raised
“ to some purpose.

“ But on what grounds shall Russia contemplate
“ her southern relations, from a point of view oppo-
“ site to that in which she contemplates her north-
“ ern relations ? Why shall she give up, in re-
“ spect to the South, those conservative maxims (!)
“ which, in circumstances entirely alike, she ri-
“ gidly maintains in the North ? Because Eng-
“ land wishes to gain the position of Constanti-
“ nople (! !) But is not the case the same in re-
“ gard to Copenhagen also ? (! ! !) and is not the
“ larger export of Russia at the present time
“ through the Baltic and the North Sea ? Yet,
“ on closer examination, it actually appears that
“ the interest of England in Copenhagen is rather
“ negative, and in so far offensive ; in Constanti-
“ nople, on the contrary, positive, and on that ac-
“ count defensive ; while the interests of Russia
“ are in a reverse order. England obtains a great

“ part of her imports through the Baltic and the
“ North Sea. Here she is the receiver, and for
“ that reason has the ability to assume the offen-
“ sive. On the other hand ; it is the British Ex-
“ ports which are concerned in the East. And
“ just because England in the East is the giver,
“ she sees herself thereby limited to a defensive
“ policy. Now in the case of Russia the opposite
“ relation holds, so that this power gains her of-
“ fensive where England is placed on the defen-
“ sive, an offensive which is to be viewed as a re-
“ prisal for England’s hold on the Baltic and the
“ North Sea. .

“ But while in this manner we elucidate (!) the
“ Southern Turkish and the Northern Scandina-
“ vian question, we reach the only fit station for
“ judging of both questions. As Russia expects
“ the well-secured (!!) neutrality of the Scandina-
“ vian kingdoms ; so England requires the well-
“ secured neutrality of the Ottoman Empire. Here
“ England is perfectly in the right ; and so far as
“ the British policy aims at nothing beyond, not
“ the slightest objection can be raised on the part

“ of Russia. Russia has never disputed the reasonableness of this demand, but rather has continually respected it (!) The international law of Europe then shall guard the Dardanelles as well as the Sound; and a hostile combination of powers, which could end only in the ruin of the states immediately participating, will there, as here, be avoided. Hence the Emperor Nicholas, impressed with these views, has on every opportunity been at pains to shew regard for (!) and to strengthen, as far as was possible, (! !) the independence of the Sublime Porte.

“ The conflict of 1828 and 1829 arose from a challenge of the Sultan, as is known to all the world. When, however, Sir Robert Gordon explained that, if the Russian troops advanced farther, there would be an end of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian army halted; since Russia desired no war of annihilation to Turkey, (!) but on the contrary her preservation, (!) and her neutral permanence. Thus, with a view to the neutrality of Turkey, the 7th article of the treaty of Adrianople stipulated the free entrance into

“ the Black Sea of all commercial flags without
“ distinction, indeed on the same terms which had
“ been secured for trading vessels under the Rus-
“ sian flag. . Russia did not, in this instance, ex-
“ cept herself in the most remote degree; since the
“ neutrality of the Porte could not well be con-
“ joined with a preference in favour of any one
“ power: though here questions entirely commer-
“ cial were alone brought under consideration; and
“ a different stipulation in regard to such ques-
“ tions, would not have been in the least at vari-
“ ance with a relation of neutrality.

“ Further, when, in 1833, Ibrahim Pacha, having
“ been victorious at Koniah, advanced on the Otto-
“ man capital, with the fixed intention of putting
“ an end to the Turkish Empire; the Porte thereon
“ had recourse to England, and the Emperor of
“ Russia declared he would view without jealousy
“ or mistrust the assistance Turkey might receive
“ from England. Nevertheless England delayed;
“ the occasion was urgent. Then Russia supplied
“ her aid at the express solicitation of the Sultan.
“ Ten thousand Russians encamped on the Asiatic

“ shore of the Bosphorus. However, as soon as
“ Ibrahim had recrossed the Taurus, the Russian
“ auxiliary troops instantly quitted the Turkish
“ soil. The consequence was, as is well known, the
“ treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi.

“ Of the eight years for which this compact was
“ concluded, five have already expired ; and Eu-
“ rope can now decide whether that treaty has, in
“ the least degree, compromised or injured the in-
“ dependent existence and neutrality of the Porte.
“ The principle of the exclusion of foreign ships
“ of war from the Dardanelles admits no exception.
“ Under the expression foreign (in regard to the
“ Porte) Russian ships of war are excluded, as
“ well as those of other powers. Russia did not
“ exempt herself; and, as the separate article proves,
“ reserved to herself no privilege of access. In or-
“ der completely to annihilate every suspicion of
“ that kind, the emperor remitted to the Sultan
“ the last instalment of his debt which was due ;
“ and the Russian troops evacuated Silistria, where
“ an imperial gift of a hundred Russian cannon
“ was left for the Sultap. Because the emperor

“ is too noble not to stamp the character of Russian policy with her own greatness of soul (!)
“ But his sight is also too acute not to perceive
“ that the present frontier of Russia toward Turkey is the most advanced he can establish for his
“ empire, without disjoining himself from powerful allied states, and thus sacrificing more weighty
“ interests than the acquisition of a few provinces
“ could repay. And Russia is not unaware that
“ the possession of Constantinople would merely
“ be the cause of dissensions ; and that hence this
“ acquisition would be attended by the same consequences to the colossal Empire of the North
“ which it formerly produced on Rome.”*

All this sounds very tranquillizing. But let us now hear likewise what a Frenchman, Armand Lefebvre, said not long since on the same topic, in the “ *Revue des deux Mondes*.” “ It is clear as
“ day that Russia, in pressing forward to the Bosphorus, will not pause ;—though she would, she

* A curious specimen of the dust gravely thrown in the eyes of the honest Germans.—Tr.

“ cannot. She can be at ease and well fenced about,
“ only when in possession of the Dardanelles. ‘ *It*
“ ‘ *is necessary that I have in my pocket the key of*
“ ‘ *my house,*’ said Alexander in the year 1808;
“ when, in anticipation of a speedy dismemberment
“ of Turkey, he insisted with his confederate Na-
“ poleon on having possession of Constantinople.
“ The whole designs of the Russian Cabinet are
“ compressed into these remarkable words. More-
“ over, the court of St Petersburg knew perfectly
“ well that slavery is an oppressive burden even
“ for the most abject minds. But how could such
“ a condition be otherwise than oppressive to the
“ energetic Sultan ; whose whole reign was a con-
“ test as persevering as ineffectual, against the
“ destiny which seems to have produced his suc-
“ cesses and his discomfiture for public admira-
“ tion? The emperor was obliged to guard against
“ the Sultan’s making a final effort to withdraw
“ from Russian protection, and place himself un-
“ der the shield of those powers whose imme-
“ diate interests demand the preservation of Tur-
“ key. Undoubtedly, though at the present mo-
“ ment the policy of Russia seems inclined to peace

“ and moderation ; yet, should events place in her
“ hand the long coveted prey, eagerly will she seize
“ and retain it,—unless it should be wrenched from
“ her again and appropriated by a stronger power.

“ Russia, stimulated by a craving ambition, must
“ endeavour to add to her political and military in-
“ fluence, the supremacy also in trade ; at least, in
“ so far as such supremacy is within her reach.
“ The Russian government is too clear sighted not
“ to know, that in the 19th century a really power-
“ ful state can exist; only by the development of all
“ the energies of the people, of all the natural
“ wealth, of all the elements of progressive civili-
“ zation. Russia seems to be ashamed of her bar-
“ barism; and it is her greatest boast, gradually to
“ improve her material civilization, and to raise
“ herself to the level of the nations of Western
“ Europe. Once in the possession of the Bospho-
“ rus, and having the markets of the East subject
“ to her sway, she would not be slow to drive out
“ the English manufactures with the productions
“ of her own industry.

“ Hence the acquisition of Constantinople is for
“ Russia a question which, though most essential to
“ her policy, perhaps affects in a still higher degree
“ her commerce and marine. Were the finest pro-
“ vinces of Turkey, were the Dardanelles especially,
“ in the grasp of Russia; the consequence would be,
“ the acquisition of resources so abundant, and a
“ maritime position so favourable, that the Russian
“ navy would necessarily be advanced to an over-
“ whelming superiority; while now, on the contrary,
“ from the obstruction of the Porte, the Russian
“ fleets are as it were caught and imprisoned in
“ the Black Sea. The Mediterranean, also, has till
“ this time been closed to Russian enterprise. But
“ were Constantinople to become Russian; Eng-
“ land would have in the waters of the Levant a
“ rival who, if conjoined with France, might suc-
“ ceed in despoiling Great Britain of the Ionian
“ Islands and Malta.”

This reasoning of a Frenchman is the best answer to that of the Russian Pamphleteer, and we have nothing to add. But, beyond all doubt—and we continue to repeat that we attach the highest

importance to the fact—Russia, unaided, has not the ability to accomplish any of her projects in the East; hitherto, and now more than ever, does she require an alliance. Her military force never was, and is at the present conjuncture still less, to be relied on. Her main stay must be her superior tact in the prudent choice and employment of those who act with her.

Up to this time Russia has leant on the Holy Alliance, which was a confederacy based on political principle. So long as the struggle of political principles engaged the attention of Europe, and so long as the one principle to which Russian homage was paid, maintained the ascendancy, embarrassing even England by means of a Tory administration; Russia occupied a very advantageous position in Europe: indeed she profited by making various conquests at the expense of Persia and the Porte, without interruption from England or Austria. At the same time, Russia, by means of her embassies and the press, fanned, in Western Europe, the flame of the war of principles, though herself carefully avoiding to become implicated.

Having avowed the maxims of absolute monarchy and legitimacy, she roused in others a zeal for them with a spirit hostile to liberalism ; and by assuming the control, greatly fortified her own influence. But mere principles soon ceased to be a cause of strife. On the one hand, the second French Revolution subsided into a system of moderation and forbearance. On the other hand, the Tory administration fell ; and England was seen to accept the proffered friendship of France. In both these countries the opposition parties successively lost their weight and credit. The cabinets had won the day ; and thenceforth their disputes with each other were no longer regarding principles, but peculiar interests. Thus were principles lost sight of, and the subject of national interests became conspicuous ; a turn of events very prejudicial to Russia.*

* The Russian pamphleteer, who wrote "The European Pentarchy", cannot conceal his wrath at this unlooked for change ; and, hurried away by selfish views, so far denies his political creed, as to indulge in the hope that Radicalism may oust the Whig Ministry in England ; totally subvert the British constitution ; abolish the antinational alliance with France : and for the benefit of Russia, paralyze to the utmost the

From this time forward Russia could not awaken sympathies through the medium of principles. She endeavoured to gain the same object by starting kindred interests.

The present moment is unfavourable for such views. When the attention of Europe is directed to any other quarter, Russia exults ; but she likes not to be herself the object of attention. Hence it is not improbable that the hired journalists of Russia may, regarding this point, divulge the truth, when they assure us that Russia is most peaceably inclined, and eager to avoid further conquests in the East—without any desire whatever for the possession of Constantinople, but merely to protect the Sultan. For this, as for every former undertaking of Russia in Europe, alliances are requisite ; but latterly

strength of Great Britain. Can Radicalism then be in secret league with the Russian autocracy ? And does the rigour with which the principle of absolute monarchy is enforced by Russia, in certain cases, admit of an exception ? However, the author is right. In the intercourse of nations, principles are but lightly esteemed ; all questions are decided on the ground of interest ; and the Russian pamphleteer has only perhaps fallen into the error of disclosing what he ought to have concealed.

allies have stood aloof, and demanded a greater price for their adherence. •

The coalition with Austria against the revolutionary phrenzy of the West, and arising from the political principle of the Holy Alliance, does not apply in this case. Nor does the intimate connection with Prussia, founded on the same principle, and cemented by family ties, altogether set aside every question of interest. The idea, fondly entertained and advocated by Pozzo di Borgo, of a combination of Russian, Prussian, and French interests against England and Austria, cannot be realized.

• That anonymous Russian book, “The European Pentarchy,” moreover asserts, that the interests of the nearest neighbours are not easily reconciled; and plainly lays down as a general rule, that natural alliances, such as rest on mutual interest, can be concluded, not with adjoining states, but only with their next neighbour. In order to test the soundness of this rule; a more intimate connection of Russia is proposed with such countries as are separated from her by Austria and Prussia; a conjunction,

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in the first instance with the smaller Confederate States of Germany, in the second instance with France.

The flattering prospect is held out to the smaller German States of a greater degree of independence, to induce them to renounce the double guardianship of Austria and Prussia, as in 1806 they renounced the constitution of the Empire. He suggests the forming among themselves a peculiar confederacy (what is termed a European Central Association) under a Russian Protectorate, resembling the former Confederation of the Rhine in the days of Napoleon. Russia would then afford them her protection ; in the hope of diminishing, for her own advantage, the influence of Austria and Prussia.

But, he proceeds, should the small German States be slow to understand the hint, and should a Russian protectorate not be agreeable to their tastes ; there is still another *neighbour* of the neighbours of Russia, and one from whom something more may be expected, namely, France. It would not

be the first time that Russia and France have combined against one or other of the German powers ; and whenever the Government of France is firmly re-established, there would be no impediment in the way of a union of Russian and French interests.*

Respecting the said protectorate, the pamphleteer seems to have forgotten, that though, when constrained by a great superiority of force, and in circumstances of difficulty, small states may at times submit to a protectorate ; still it is what they never voluntarily seek. Besides, the Minor German States, since their happy release from the protectorate of Napoleon, have never yet felt a desire for new guardianship. No one has so assailed them, as to prove any thing like a protector or defender necessary for their existence.

* With this feeling he hopes that the radical tendency in France will be subdued, and the authority of the government confirmed ; while, with reference to England, he prays that there the government may be embarrassed and undermined by Radicalism. A contradiction, so far as principle is concerned, but by no means in regard to interest.

As for a closer alliance of Russia with France ; it is not merely the casual thought of a single pamphleteer. Such an alliance has been often dwelt on by different persons of note, particularly by Pozzo di Borgo, with whom it was a project fondly cherished ; and even in France itself voices have been raised in favour of Russia. It is natural, that the two great powers encompassing Germany on opposite sides, should have a common interest in abridging and dividing as much as possible the strength of the German Confederacy ; whether by the endeavour to carry forward the conquests on German soil begun so far back as the peace of Westphalia ; or by accumulating power sufficient to turn the scale of the affairs of Europe, without control or opposition from any of the States of Germany. Thus, as early as the seven years' war, Russia and France united against Prussia ; and in 1809, the same powers joined against Austria. After the downfall of Napoleon, Talleyrand most dexterously brought about a strong sympathy between the Emperor Alexander and Louis XVIII. ; a sympathy which, as is well known, preserved Lorraine and Alsace to France. When Russia, in

1828, attacked the Sublime Porte, England and Austria remained most unwilling spectators ; Charles X., on the contrary, was ready to arm in behalf of Russia, and to march upon Vienna in the event of Austrian interference.* After the exile of Charles X., a warm disposition in favour of the Poles was no doubt shewn by the republican party in France ; but it was soon suppressed by Louis Philippe, who employed his influence with the chiefs and leaders of the Polish insurrection, in a manner highly beneficial to Russia. .

Meanwhile the new alliance of Russia with France is not matured. Louis Philippe cannot yet act freely, while by procrastination he gains the advantage of being enabled to set a higher price on his adhesion ; nor is Russia herself injured by the delay. Here also we adopt the views of Mr Armand Lefebvre ; at the same time without intending him too high an honour, for we shall afterwards have much to condemn in his writings.

* Pozzo di Borgo's despatches of date 28th November 1828, have been printed in the portfolio.

Mr Lefebvre, contemplating the position of Russia with respect to the Porte, says, " The guardian permits his victim to live enchained, till without any danger to himself, he finds a favourable opportunity -to inflict the last blow. For even in their present condition, the Western States are fully able to keep Russia within bounds. Should a war prematurely break out ; Russia would have to dread a collision with all the powers of Europe. This is the secret cause of her assumed moderation. Moreover, by such procedure, no risk is incurred. It is wonderful with what certainty Russia can abide her time ; in Turkey she has no further supremacy, no further opposition, to overcome ; she knows exactly the weakness of that empire. She has even excavated the abyss into which some day she will be tempted to hurl the Porte."

" By means of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, Russia has given herself a right of interference in the internal management of Turkey ; she has, so to speak, caused the key of the Dardanelles to be delivered up to her. The Porte became bound, at the simple demand of Russia, to close these

straits against foreign ships. What more can the court of St Petersburg desire? Peace is to them a source of unquestionable benefit. In full enjoyment of prosperity, the southern provinces of Russia are making gigantic progress; their industry is marvellous; each day brings them a step nearer to perfection. Upheld by her political superiority, Russia can inundate the markets of the East with Russian productions; her population increases in number, in intelligence, in wealth. An inconsiderate war might endanger all these advantages, and check the rapid growth of her power. We may therefore remain assured that Russia will, at least for a long while, desire the continuance of a state of things which is so profitable, without being accompanied by the smallest hazard."

FRANCE. "

In a comparative estimate of national power, it must never be forgotten that the great preponderance which France maintained in Europe, first under Louis XIV, and subsequently under Napoleon ; was, on the one hand, owing to a greater degree of weakness and disunion among her enemies, than need be anticipated in every future war ; on the other hand, to the great excitement of the Revolution, by its character only a temporary impulse. France is not naturally summoned to take the lead in Europe ; she can only assume such a position occasionally and for a limited period. Still France ever remains a commanding power.

The chief strength of the French resides in their NATIONALITY. The honourable acknowledgment

cannot be withheld from them of largely possessing the virtue of patriotism ; and of always maintaining inviolate their patriotic character, to whatever other excesses they may abandon themselves. The most feeble party among them, which should lend itself to foreign schemes, would be branded with eternal infamy. The vast majority of the nation, though continually at variance with regard to their internal policy, are unanimous in their zeal to uphold the greatness and power of France, and her independence of all foreigners. Statesmen not otherwise remarkable for their purity, have yet never swerved from promoting the true interests of France : of such men Talleyrand is a striking example. Under every circumstance, the people and the army may be relied on, when the object in view is national glory. The meanest Frenchman is capable of the noblest sacrifice for his country. In the hour of danger and of warlike excitement, the most profligate Parisian, as well as the most illiterate peasant from the provinces, were the honour of France at stake, would invariably prove himself a hero. Our admiration of the French is limited only by the circumstance,

that though irresistible in success, they become impatient under misfortune, and are changeable in their inclinations.

Of the power of RELIGIOUS OPINION in France, there is none that can now be applied to purposes of state. The Catholic party is weak, and moreover is in opposition, rather a clog than serviceable to the government; and infidelity, since it was made bankrupt in 1793, no longer excites any enthusiasm, though many writers are eager in their endeavours to revive its mischievous sway. All is sinking into indifference; and it would be as impossible to raise up a new religious sect in France, similar to the *Theophilanthropism* of the Revolution, as it would be to return to the ancient church. St Simonianism has proved the impossibility of a religious sect; while the dislike to the church is equally clear from the expulsion of the Jesuits; nor was the attempt of Lamennais less desperate to reconcile the Hierarchy and the Democracy.

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Now though the state derives from this irreligious apathy, the advantage at least of there not

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being in the country any strong religious party to contend with; yet the people suffer indirectly through the demoralization inseparable from religious indifference; which not only dissipates a large fund of zeal; but likewise affects the public service, degrading the executive by the introduction of such a system of avarice, nepotism, and corruption, as in the end the best government will be unable to control.*

From the POLITICAL PRINCIPLE, France, on the contrary, has long derived great advantages: Beginning with Louis XIV, who upheld, and infected most of the monarchs of his time with the principle of absolute monarchy; then at the Revolution, which exaggerated the opposite principle, imbuing the populace of other nations with republicanism; again under Napoleon, who regenerated the principle of Louis XIV, and maintained it till his fall; though latterly he endeavoured to figure again as a

* With whatever sins of omission or commission the French people may be charged; the expressions of the learned author are more applicable to the age of Louis XV. than to the reign of Louis Philippe.—TR.

revolutionary and republican hero, courting the liberals in order to subvert the restored dynasty. This liberalism, hitherto so effectual, has once more done good service to the French ; namely, by awakening, almost immediately after the great war, sympathies in their favour, among those very nations who shortly before had invaded France herself with the utmost animosity. But every day their hopes diminish of being able, through means of a war of principle, and by revolutionizing Europe anew, to recover what they lost in 1814 ; the government is also too weak to attempt to glide back into the other extreme, and undertake a Russian alliance. In the mean while France can wait ; and as the die may be cast ; whether the German States combine or remain at variance ; whether they act prudently or imprudently ; she can watch her opportunities. If the wedge of discord cannot be driven into Germany ; if no revolutionary outbreak takes place then ; if nothing is to be gained by advocating liberalism ; there still remains the old French policy, and an alliance with Russia.

In promoting their MATERIAL INTERESTS, the

French are not remarkably skilled. Individually, there is no lack among them of a desire of gain; but the ministry and the chambers are, for the most part, otherwise employed. However important, also, it may be for Louis Philippe to direct the views of the people into such a channel, and withdraw them from political opposition, he has not yet been successful in his endeavour; and in their system of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, there prevails neither unity nor liberality.

Hence it appears that France has a very strong, and likewise a very weak, side. She rejoices, moreover, in the great advantage that she is secure against aggression; that no one dare plunder her unless she herself becomes the assailant. Consequently she may remain at rest; till, through the dissensions of her neighbours, or through potent alliances, an opportunity presents itself of realizing the old dreams of ambition, which the pages of the *National* have most faithfully retained.

These day-dreams have become so thoroughly

incorporated with the national pride of the French, as to render impossible the assurance, that some future government of France, be it revolutionary or after the fashion of Louis XIV, may not endeavour to put them in execution. The object of the French, if not again to take the lead in Europe, yet certainly is, to reunite with France the whole left bank of the Rhine. They are eager to obtain the Rhenish frontier, which in France is, by universal consent, denominated their national boundary; though by the rest of the world it has been admitted that not rivers but mountains form natural barriers, and that language forms the most natural demarcation of all. The line separating the districts on either side of which the French and the German languages are spoken, does not actually follow the course of rivers, but the direction of mountains.

In the year 1814, Germany recovered only a part of the incontestably German soil, with German population and language, which, at an earlier period, had been forcibly and cunningly appropriated by France. Another very valuable part,

German Lorraine, Alsace, and Suntgau, remained with France. Nevertheless this division, so favourable to the French, and so detrimental to Germany, is styled by Mr Armand Lefebvre, an ignominious mutilation of France. He declares it ought not to be endured, and that the whole left bank of the Rhine must again be French. “ The Belgian revolution first broke in two that frightful ring within which the modern Popiliuses would confine our beautiful country. The strong places raised against us, which were upheld and garrisoned by our conquerors, are now turned against them, and have become our northern bulwark. Justly, therefore, has it been said, that hostile Europe has retired from the Maese as far as the Scheldt. Still our frontier is incomplete. It will be well defined, only when we extend ourselves again to the Rhine, and when Prussia and Bavaria withdraw to the right bank. Whoever in France bears in his bosom a heart devoted to the greatness, the honour, and the safety of his country, must be filled with pain when he thinks of the weakness of our frontiers; must with all his energies endeavour to find an opportunity of escape from such a

perilous situation. Our patriotism must not be enervated in the soft enjoyments of peace. We must never forget what we once were. Since 1830, we have borne the consequences of these changes with admirable moderation. Europe would, however, be in error, were it, on that account, to be concluded that we have for ever resigned possessions, so imperatively required for the security of our soil and our capital. We are not to be eternally fettered to the system of peace. Peace is merely a respite. On the day when war breaks out on any side, we too shall appear on the stage to vindicate our rights."

This language is very intelligible. Armand Lefebvre does not, however, misapprehend the difficulties to be encountered in an ill advised attempt at regaining the left bank of the Rhine. He is fully aware that France would be able to execute her plans, only by means of potent alliances. His scheme is to employ for this purpose the conflict in the east; and to employ it *either in one way or in another*. The one way is, a general league of all the rest of Europe against Russia, under a cove-

nant that France, as a reward for her participation in that league, should obtain Egypt and the left bank of the Rhine. The other way is, an alliance of France with Russia, with or without Prussia, against England and Austria; in which case also he anticipates that equal advantages would accrue to France.

He explains his views in the following manner : —First, in regard to the great Anti-Russian league. Such a league, he remarks, is in no way conducive to the interests of France, but only to the interests of England and of Austria; these two powers, however, must necessarily attach such importance to a coalition with France, that, for its attainment, no price can to them seem too high. “ Were the Court of Vienna embarrassed by an equivocal position with France, her troops dare not march for the East; and Turkey would be irretrievably lost. Austria has most to gain in averting the downfall of the Porte. Her own independence would be endangered were Turkey abandoned to the Russians. The Austrians cannot act freely against Russia unless they can rely on aid from France;

and this aid the cabinets of Vienna and London must endeavour to secure on any terms. Weighty considerations might certainly determine France to unite with the forces of these two powers; yet it is clear she will not resign herself to them unconditionally."

Mr Lefebvre then proposes, that Prussia being compensated with Warsaw and Saxony; in return, her Rhenish Provinces, as well as the Rhenish Palatinate of Bavaria, should be transferred to France. Poland is given up entirely, and delivered over to Prussia; who is thus to bear with calmness the cessions proposed to be made by her in the West. "It is certain that neither Austria nor Prussia will surrender their Polish provinces. Consequently, that portion of the duchy of Warsaw which Alexander erected into a kingdom, could alone be restored to Polish nationality. But this would be a mutilation of Poland, a mere fragment of a mighty kingdom. Would not such a restoration perpetually recal the former national unity? Would it not keep alive the feelings of disquiet and sedition? Would it not afford re-

fuge, in the event of difficulties and provocation, to the Polish subjects, of Russia, Austria, and Prussia? Hence neither Austria nor Prussia would ever consent even to a partial restoration of ancient Poland. Still, without the co-operation of Austria and Prussia, France can effect nothing on the Vistula. On the contrary, should Prussia become possessed of the rich provinces between the Niemen and the Warta; should she, moreover, obtain the whole of Saxony; then not only would the title and distinction of a monarchy of the first rank be her due, but such, in truth and reality, she would be. Instead of placing herself under the dictation of Russia; like an ambitious man who, having his fortune to make, resigns himself soul and body to the patron at whose hands he expects wealth and greatness; Prussia would assume the commanding and tranquil position of a State arrived at maturity, and having no further occasion to hazard a war, unless perhaps in order to quell the turbulence of an aspiring neighbour.”

“ The reannexing to the French territory a part

of the great duchy of the Lower Rhine, would necessarily lead also to the appropriation of the Rhenish circle now under the dominion of Bavaria. Doubtless, amid the changes to which the formation of a new European system would naturally give rise, means would also be found to provide indemnities for the Court of Munich and the House of Saxony. Still there is one circumstance to be noticed. The possession of the left bank of the Rhine, would not only confirm to France her military line toward the north-east; it would likewise bind to her system the new kingdom of Belgium."

Should this amusing scheme come to nought; Mr Armand Lefebvre has a second in reserve. "If England and Austria, blinded by selfishness, and an innate jealousy of every thing that tends to promote the renown and the grandeur of France, were to manifest an intention of reducing her to the inferior rank of a secondary power; with one hand taking her in tow to the waters of the Levant; with the other confining her to those narrow boundaries which they designedly set for her, in order that she may always be held under their

control : then would France be relieved from all scruples and from all obligations in respect to Europe ; she would then be placed under the necessity of fulfilling exclusively the obligations she owes to herself ; it would then become her duty to take heed for the maintenance of her own dignity, and of her relative power ; to stand arrayed on the battle field, to proclaim that she cannot be isolated. Soon, too, she would not stand alone. Russia would stretch forth her arms to France, and grounds would not be wanting to recommend such a league to her acceptance, with a view to profit, greatness, and fame. The cause of Russia, all things well considered, is the cause of humanity and civilization (!!) Providence seems to guide the steps of this power, and to favour her plans (!) ”

The hitherto existing connection with England, says Mr Lefebvre, can be dissolved ; it is besides unnatural. Principles must yield to interests. “ In spite of the alliances now in force for gaining the ascendancy of political principles, the remaining interests will burst out afresh, as soon as they are restored to the energy of their tendencies. It is

also advisable that comprehensive and provident measures should be adopted, to reconcile and equalize the claims of the present with the warnings of the future. Who does not see that, from the rocky heights of Malta and Gibraltar, England strives for the sovereignty of the Mediterranean? In this peculiarly French sea, England is, beyond all others, the most vexatious rival of France. The future greatness of her possessions in Africa has not a more formidable enemy. Hence, far from desiring to exclude Russia from the Mediterranean; with reference to maritime dominion, it suits, perhaps, better the interest of France even to invite the co-operation of the Czar; for, with Russian aid, it might be possible for France to succeed in driving the British flag altogether from the Mediterranean waters."

Napoleon at Erfurt and Tilsit; the Bourbons too, after their restoration, as previously during the seven years' wars, encouraged the idea of an alliance with Russia against Austria and England. Charles X in 1828 was on the very point of throwing off the mask.*

* See the despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo of 14th Decem-

And Louis Philippe, however outwardly hostile to Russia, has still surreptitiously done numerous small services to promote the Russian interests. Who else, by a diplomatic manœuvre, paralyzed the arm of Skrzynecki, and sent astray General Ramerino?—notwithstanding the Polish festivals in Paris, and the bold speeches from the throne, which nominally affected to guarantee the nationality of Poland.

On the other side, the Russian author of “the European Pentarchy” has likewise signified his approbation of the French alliance. But he remarks, “France must, above all things, endeavour to have her internal affairs, in the first place, thoroughly regulated; before she can be in a situation again to inspire confidence abroad. So long as the mo-

ber 1828, printed in the Portfolio. The Count announces to the Emperor Nicholas that the King of France (Charles X.) had said to him. “I wish to remain united to Russia. If the Emperor Nicholas attacks Austria, I hold myself in preparation, and shall regulate my conduct according to circumstances; but if Austria attacks him, I march immediately against her. Perhaps war with the Court of Vienna will be beneficial to me; it will put an end to internal dissensions, and occupy the nation at large in the way it desires.”

narchy continues obliged to make terms for its legalized existence, the condition of France must be viewed merely as provisional."

The difficulties in the way of an alliance between France and Russia, Mr Armand Lefebvre does not consider insurmountable.

" The first requisite for a sincere approximation of France to Russia, would be, on the part of Russia, the withdrawal of all claims to precedence ; and an acknowledgment of the equality of France, as the basis of any future league. The alliance which, in the year 1807, Napoleon and Alexander concluded at Tilsit, was a genuine alliance ; because on the raft on the Niemen, the two emperors divided between themselves the supremacy of the civilized world. The one took under his control the north and the east ; the other the south and the west. They agreed that both empires should keep the same pace, in such manner that if the one enlarged itself on one side, the other should have the right of extending itself proportionally elsewhere."

“ This alliance was, in reality, dissolved by the overthrow of Austria at Wagram ; because thenceforth there did not remain, between the territories of Russia and France, any power equivalent to Austria. But at the present time, were the principle of equality acknowledged by both ; no two other states could be found standing in a relation more favourable for a strict alliance. Evidently no immediate contact of frontier is possible. The whole of Germany intervenes to prevent every collision. Such an alliance would have the effect of restraining their common enemy, England ; and, without doubt, would afterwards destroy her pretensions to the dominion of the sea. On the one side is shewn a vehement ambition for oriental aggrandizement ; on the other an anxiety to secure the defences of her Eastern frontier. Were both powers united, the whole Continent would be theirs ; no other power, no coalition, could withstand them. They would dispose of every thing ; conduct every design ; and decide on every question without appeal. On one point only do their views differ ; their policy is not founded on the same principle. But since a wide space divides

them; since they belong each to very different grades of civilization; it is hardly possible that any moral effect can be produced on their respective populations. With the simple exception of a war of principles; the different forms of the two governments can be no insuperable obstacle to their harmony. This approximation of France and Russia has likewise been plainly indicated by the nature of things. For forty years, in spite of the endeavours of other courts to disjoin them, these two powers have always been disposed to enter into close alliance with each other. Paul I. in 1800, Alexander in 1809 and 1815, Nicholas from his accession to the throne till the year 1830, all sought to gain the support of France."

"On the Eastern question, the alliance of France, if imbued with a political character, would be of decided importance to Russia. It must at once be seen that could they agree about their plans; Austria would have no choice, but must yield to circumstances, and reckon herself fortunate to share in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, could Russia bring over France to her

policy, she would likewise secure the compliance of Austria. England insulated, and circumscribed within to her own resources, would not be in a posture to rescue Turkey. And the Czar would gain this great end almost without an effort."

"The Court of St Petersburg is also deeply interested in securing the assistance of France in her Oriental measures. It may be confidently foretold that, should Russia be compelled by emergencies or ambition to relinquish her procrastinating and cautious policy; she would on the same day forget all bygone resentments, and disclaim her prepossession for dethroned legitimacy: nor would her pride disdain an application for an alliance with that dynasty which arose from the barricades."

A letter from Paris, inserted in the *Algemeine Zeitung* of 1839, No. 310, coincides exactly with these views. Therein it is stated, "Louis Philippe desires nothing more earnestly than a reconciliation between France and Russia; but he knows that the season is not yet come." It is hence be-

yond dispute that Louis Philippe has not done what Russia wished, simply because of his resolution to shew the St Petersburg Cabinet his independence of them ; knowing, too, how much more his friendship was actually worth. By such procedure Louis Philippe may have provoked animosity. “ This animosity, however, gives him no alarm. He is satisfied it has brought him so much the nearer to the object of his anxiety—an alliance with Russia ; and made the Cabinet of St Petersburg feel, if not his positive, at least his negative strength. He is fully aware that no irritation, no chagrin, will eventually withstand the force of that peremptory interest ; which must finally attach Russia to France.”

A U S T R I A.

In order to understand the very peculiar position of Austria; there must first be an accurate conception of her double character as a European and as a German State.

The Imperial Government of Austria is the historical heir of the Roman dominion acquired by the Germans; the heir of that universal monarchy of Christendom which ideally comprehended every Christian people. Even yet the Austrian Empire extends over Germanic, Romanic, and Slavonic tribes; the three great branches of the European family. Austria has been unable to prevent the establishment of other centres of Germanic forms in England and Prussia; of Romanic manners in

France ; and of Slavonic customs in Russia. Circumscribed in this respect, she has felt the necessity of relinquishing the splendid idea of her original grandeur ; without the good fortune of being able to retire on the support of one great undivided nation. The circumstance of including among her subjects many distinct NATIONALITIES, might be beneficial to Austria, were the scheme of a universal Christian empire to be revived among mankind. But since there is no prospect of any such scheme ; the numerous languages in which prayers are offered up to Heaven in behalf of the sovereign, far from being advantageous, must rather be a cause of anxiety to the government of this mighty state. Not being placed in those favourable circumstances which allow an offensive policy to be adopted [by] the English, the Russians, and the French ; Austria is obliged to limit herself to a policy conservative and defensive. Energetic populations, trained in habitual loyalty, and in general, from their cheerful and quiet dispositions, contented with their lot ; obey the illustrious House of Hapsburg, and have sustained its honour in innu-

merable wars. Nevertheless these populations are not connected by the bond of Nationality.

At the same time it must not be imagined altogether, as a consequence, that in the large kingdoms composing the Austrian Empire, the populations, which are not German, yield a merely passive submission, and are alienated from the reigning dynasty. Their attachment is grounded on an interest perfectly obvious and well understood. Who does not at once perceive that the Hungarians owe to the House of Hapsburg the maintenance of their nationality? Without such aid, they would long since have fallen under the yoke of Islam. They have also preserved their constitution under a king of German descent; a privilege they would never have retained had they fallen under Turkish rule; or had they, like the Poles, been subjected to Russia. It accords with the Austrian method of government to leave each nation of the empire to its own individuality, and in the enjoyment of its ancient customs; while the Russian system demands an implicit and uniform obedience to the all-levelling pressure of autocracy.

But is a distinct existence a possible condition for Hungary? Forsaking her ancient attachment, did she refuse any longer to unite her destiny with the German; would she not be compelled to admit another supremacy in exchange for the mild sway of Austria? And the Poles,—have they not manifestly inclined the more strongly to Austria, in proportion as they recede from the North?

From the power of RELIGIOUS OPINION and the CHURCH, Austria accepts only a conditional support. By far the larger number of her subjects are Catholic, and thoroughly Catholic. There are no religious heart-burnings in Austria: scepticism has no influence within her dominions:—an immunity invaluable for the executive. Since France has lapsed into infidelity, and the Pyrenean Peninsula has become disordered; Austria may now be considered as the only power which gives effectual support to the Romish See, and which, therefore, has a claim on Apostolical gratitude and services;—an additional and manifest advantage to Austria. Nevertheless the possession of this source of power is accompanied with

much embarrassment. Austria gains an authoritative countenance for her internal, but not at the same time for her external, policy. The stronger emphasis she might lay on her Catholicism ; the more she might seek to employ her apostolical influence against other nations ; the greater would be her risk of exciting antipathies, which on no consideration she dare hazard ; lest, instead of accomplishing any object of her own, she should merely promote the designs of her enemies.

The advantage which Austria derives from the power of POLITICAL PRINCIPLE, at least in regard to her external policy, is also conditional. She stands on the side of Absolutism, but only in the second rank, the first being occupied by Russia. Austria must feel that Russia appropriates the whole merit of that system, while she herself is unable to obtain a share. In one instance, the constitutional forms of Hungary are an exception to the absolutism of Austria ; by Russia, however, that mode of government is maintained without the slightest deviation. Then, again, Austria borders immediately on the constitutional states of the

West, and is more exposed than Russia to the effects of contiguity and example. Russia, shut out in the back ground of Europe, possesses in Austria and Prussia two bulwarks against the freedom of the West.

Finally, from the power of MATERIAL INTERESTS, Austria obtains a slender benefit. She avails herself of the abundant wealth of her own territory ; but her gains from abroad are not in equal proportion, nor does she provide for herself any natural alliances by the removal of commercial restrictions.

Such being the relative position which Austria holds, as compared with England and Russia ; it will be admitted that, in truth, her situation is not equally secure, nor does she enjoy an equal amount of power. Besides, let us look back into history, and we shall find that England and Russia have for many centuries remained unconquered ; while Austria has been twice overrun, has twice been on the brink of ruin, first during the thirty

years' war, and afterwards in the time of Napoleon.

.Thus the more the Austrian policy is conservative and defensive, the more urgent becomes the necessity of rendering herself impregnable; an object to be attained only by means of natural alliances.

The Russian alliance is not a natural alliance for Austria; though Joseph II. resigned himself to the illusion, and though both states agree in the principles of Absolutism and Legitimacy. Every coalition of Austria with Russia only tends further to enlarge the dimensions of the latter state, already so colossal,—tends to augment the resources of the most formidable neighbour of Austria. In alliance with Russia, Joseph II. attacked Poland and Turkey; but the event proved that Russia alone, not Austria, was the gainer. Instead of the weak Polish republic; Austria brought to her frontier the gigantic Russia, further strengthened by the spoliation of Poland. On the Turkish side, Russia has seized the harbours of the Euxine, and at last even

the mouths of the Danube ; while Austria has been unable to recover so much as Belgrade. Russia is not the natural ally, but the natural rival, of Austria ; and we shall not err when we assume that the feeling of Russia cannot be more rancorous even toward England than it is toward Austria.

The fleets of England may do much ; but without the help of Austrian troops they can effect nothing against the military force of Russia. The prime mover in the East must be Austria, a power so close at hand, so determined, and which can so easily be reinforced by means of sympathies even within the Russian dominions. We have indeed always believed, and still believe, that the pen of Prince Metternich is a more efficacious guardian of the East than the Danube, the Balkan, and the Caucasus ; more to be relied on than all the navies of England.*

* The guardian pen must have been slumbering when the Russians were permitted to establish themselves at the mouths of the Danube and pocket the house-key of Austria. The efficacy of a different weapon may be learnt at Acre.—Tr.

On this account, also, we are not surprised to read in the Portfolio, the despatches of Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ambassador at Paris, written in as anti-Austrian a tone as can well be imagined ; and where an endeavour is made to rouse every one (that is to say, Prussia and France) against the cabinet of Vienna.* For the same reason the sentiments of Russian pamphleteers of a somewhat later date do not appear incongruous. The Memoir on the State of Germany for the year 1834, and the " European Pentarchy," attempt to produce a bias against Austria among the minor confederate states of Germany; to call to mind the old Austrian policy in respect to Bavaria; and even condescend to aim at propitiating the liberals, by characterizing the stedfast principle of Austria as

* " The attitude, the language, the demonstrations of Prussia, have, until now, been favourable to Russia; the fear of seeing her unite with us in a last emergency, over-awes Austria; and serves as an encouragement to France, confirming her in the favourable sentiments she evinces towards us."

" In my whole intercourse with the French ministry, I strive to maintain their friendly relations with the cabinet of Berlin."—Despatch from Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated Paris, the 28th November 1828.

“not adapted to the present time;” the principle of Russia being presumed to be of a nature more liberal.* The “European Pentarchy” announces also the existence of a desire in Bohemia for a union of all Slavonians (naturally under the Czar), and during the last thirty years Russia

* “The system on which the stability of Austria rests is ancient, but not of very exalted character, and ill adapted to the present time. It has never been forgotten that, by means of this system, the Ferdinands attempted to effect the subjugation of Germany.” “If the cabinet of Vienna succeed in carrying into execution their own particular views, for which purpose they may avail themselves of the interposition of the Diet of Frankfort; then would the whole of Germany be in the grasp of Austria.”—From the Russian Memoir of 1834 on the State of Germany, published in the Portfolio.

“Austria shewed, at least at an earlier period, an evident longing for the possession of Bavaria; a longing which was quite natural while Austria stood forth as the predominant power of Germany.”—From “The European Pentarchy,” published at Leipsic by Wigand, 1839.

In the last publication the minor confederate states of Germany are counselled to adopt a Russian protectorate, as a shield against Austria and Prussia. “Russia (says the pentarchist) has, by the acquisition of Poland, carried a military position which severs Austria and Prussia from each other, and is to Russia invaluable, if she were called on to protect the weak states of central Germany.”

has flattered herself with the idea of cajoling the Bohemians; as if, through her connexion with France, she had become irresistible.*

Armand Lefebvre remarks on this political constellation in the following terms: "The vocation of Austria,—her true and actual vocation, hazardous indeed, but worthy of her grandeur,—is, to preserve the central states of the Continent in their integrity and independence, to shield them against

* The author of the "Pentarchy" has printed in Italics the words of Fallmerayer and Kollar. The first says, "The supremacy over the human race seems now to retire from the people of Romanic and German origin, and to go over to the great nation of the Slavonians." The last says, "Russia, the most potent branch of the Slavonic stem, has much reason to form a closer connexion with the rest of the Slavonian nations, to vindicate the menaced purity of their Slavonianism, and, by reciprocal good offices, to renew and strengthen it."—Page 410. Bignon relates, in his History of Napoleon, that when the Emperor Alexander wished to take possession of Moldavia and Wallachia, he offered the Emperor Napoleon Bohemia as a counterpoise. "When we understand one another, Napoleon and I," said the Emperor Alexander, "all the world must o'en come to an understanding along with us." That is to say, Austria was not to be the least consulted about the matter. Napoleon, however, did not accept the "magnanimous" offer of the Czar.

the ambition of France, and above all things against the ambition of Russia; to hold these two powers in check and in equipoise, the one by means of the other. Now, in the Oriental question, Russia is the most threatening and dangerous foe. Should she succeed in gaining possession of the Lower Danube, the mountain-range of the Balkan, and Constantinople; Austria would be hemmed in by the Russian territories along the whole extent of her eastern frontier; and the Austrian commerce, both in the Euxine and in the Adriatic, would be under Russian control. There is also ground for solicitude in the secret endeavours of Russia to tamper with the loyalty of Austrian subjects professing the Greek faith. No one believes that Russia can be withheld by over-conscientious scruples from meditating covert intrigues of this nature. The conquests of Russia in Turkey place her in a situation to realize all her fondest designs. Austria would be thus fearfully menaced: her relative strength would be so materially weakened that freedom of movement would be lost. To oppose the advances of the North; there would remain to Austria nothing



save an inert resistance like that with which Prussia must content herself. Fallen from her high estate, she would be compelled to act an entirely different part. Instead of being the bulwark of the West against Russia; she would become a tool in the hands of that power for holding the East in subjugation. All the central armaments which ought to guard the West would be paralyzed, and the central states themselves threatened with the loss of their independence. Even the possession of Bosnia, Servia, Turkish Dalmatia, Albania, and Macedonia, would then be to the court of Vienna no adequate compensation for the superior aggrandisement of Russia. Russia directly, and with the aid of the Greeks, necessarily at her devotion, would exert so overwhelming an influence in these ostensibly Austrian provinces; that they would prove to their new masters much more a source of weakness and embarrassment, than a real increase of strength."

"Thus the policy of the cabinet of Vienna may be sketched by anticipation. As the enemy of Russian projects, as the extreme post of Western Europe against Russia, as the natural guardian of

Turkey and of all the interests menaced by the jeopardy of the Porte ; Austria must risk her last man and her last florin, rather than suffer the Czar to extend his dominion beyond the south bank of the Danube."

" But Russia is not the only antagonist whom Austria fears. France is viewed with still greater alarm ; and from that quarter an attack would indeed be perilous. The French maxims of government might undermine the social condition of the Austrian monarchy, and the French armies endanger her Italian ascendancy. What confusion would then ensue in an empire which extends over Italians, Hungarians, Poles, and Germans ; maintaining as various forms of administration as there are countries under its sway ; which, even during peace, is reduced to the violent necessity of employing the force of one-half of its dominions to keep the other half quiet ; which, in fine, is upheld by the antiquated maxims of a feudal oligarchy quite repugnant to the present age ? Hence the dread of the court of Vienna for the July revolution, which threatened to set Europe in a flame.

This dread, not yet allayed, impelled Austria to the adoption of the Russian system, and explains the acquiescence which for eight years has been deemed necessary regarding the pretensions of the Czar in Oriental affairs."

"But would Austria, in a really decisive crisis of the East, continue in the attitude of non-resistance, to which she has hitherto accustomed herself? A very grave question. Let an assertion be allowed, drawn from the nature of the case: to France, first of all, the task of the solution of this question will be assigned. The situation of Austria is simply this; that she is unconstrained in her proceedings against Russia, only when she can thoroughly depend on the moral and physical aid of France. A compact with England alone would not suffice to give the requisite energy to the tone and actions of the cabinet of Vienna. Neither could Austria wage war against Russia unless assured of the unequivocal co-operation of France. If France denies her concurrence; Austria is then fettered by the apprehension that, while she despatches troops against Russia,

France may cross the Alps, and suddenly pour down on Lombardy. Austria would much rather accede to the dismemberment of Turkey, than leave her Italian possessions unguarded. Consequently, she would delay; and make her appearance on the stage, only when nothing further remained to be done but to accept thankfully her allotted share of the partition. On these grounds we are convinced that, should a war break out in the East, the policy of Austria would be determined by the resolutions of France.”

But no true German can entertain this conviction. Austria is in no way constrained to sell herself to the French at the price of her independence; so long as she can enter into other alliances which will enable her to hold in check Russia and France combined.

An alliance with France is, at all times and under all circumstances, unnatural and destructive to the real interests of Austria; because it is attainable only at the expense of the rest of Germany; at the expense of Prussia, or of the smaller

states, who must ever be the natural allies, offensively and defensively combined with Austria. When Austria, at the instigation of Prince Kaunitz, allowed herself to be persuaded to coalesce with France against Prussia; she committed a mistake, of which, fortunately, the results were averted by the genius of Frederick. Even had Austria succeeded in effecting the dismemberment of Prussia, along with France and Russia; had she given up to France the Rhenish provinces, at that time belonging to Frederick, or an equivalent for them; had she likewise yielded East Prussia to Russia, and taken Silesia to herself; still she would have gained nothing. France (and Russia) would, by such partition, have become overpowerful at the expense of Germany; and very soon have inspired error into the cabinet of Vienna. Austria would now commit exactly the same mistake, were she to engage in an alliance with France; the first condition of which would be the assignment of the left bank of the Rhine to France: a scheme which has not only been proposed by Armand Lefebvre, but must also be necessarily the sole interest and aim of French policy. France would acquire the as-

cendant over Germany ; would exert a preponderating influence on the rest of the smaller states ; and Austria herself would no longer have any defence on her western frontier.

The Frenchman holds his alliance to be indispensable. But he offers his wares somewhat too soon, and asks too high a price, before knowing whether any one is really in want of them. We shall now look around ; and try to discover some other guarantees for the safety of Austria.

A natural alliance for Austria is an alliance with England. England, too, has ever been on her side in all the great European wars ; the conflicts arising from the Reformation, and the blunder of the Austro-Gallican alliance in the Seven years' war, alone excepted. England and Austria have always an identity of interest in preventing Russia and France from becoming too powerful. However, England alone, with her fleets, and descents on the enemy's coast, cannot give adequate support to Austria. Her aid is powerful, and ever to be duly appreciated ; but it does not of itself suffice. Aus-

tria, in order to be invincible, must have on her side not England alone : some other great continental power is required in addition.

Against France, the Spanish is an appropriate alliance for Austria ; but Spain is no longer a great power.

A Danish and Swedish alliance would be quite suitable against Russia ; but neither Denmark nor Sweden possess the necessary strength.

The truly natural alliance for Austria, on the continent, is an alliance with Prussia. Formerly, to make such an assertion would have been considered a paradox ; but it is otherwise now. So long as the ascendancy of Prussia in Northern Germany remained doubtful ; so long as she had not thoroughly established herself ; while Austria still claimed imperial supremacy, adhering to the established usage, that a prince of the empire could not rank as equal, but must of necessity be subordinate to the emperor ; the continued rivalry of Austria against Prussia was intelligible. The mo-

tive for such rivalry was the stronger ; because Russia and France had not then, in the same degree as they have since, extended their power and pretensions so as to have become dangerous to both ; not less dangerous to Prussia than to Austria. But now that the Prussian dominion in Northern Germany has been rendered secure ; now that the old imperial connexion has been dissolved ; there have ceased to be any legitimate grounds for Austrian jealousy. After Russia has encroached so far on the one side ; and on the other France has given proof, under Napoleon, of the evils she was capable of inflicting—after France and Russia, in 1808, divided between them the dominion of Europe ; and the two leading powers of Germany, Austria as well as Prussia, under the pressure of this alliance, so formidable and hostile to them both, experienced the melancholy consequences of their former dissensions—after all these things have happened ; it must appear, not only no longer a paradox, but, on the contrary, the most fitting and the most urgent policy, that Austria should endeavour to form the closest possible connexion with Prussia. Prussia is, besides, the only

ally who, associated with Austria, would herself perfectly suffice to brave every hostile power; even without taking into account that England, and probably too the other confederate States of Germany, would not remain inactive spectators. The military force of Prussia, combined with that of Austria, has no cause to dread any enemy, come whence he may, from the east or from the west; nay though enemies should approach on both sides at once. At the same time it is not to be overlooked, how popular such an alliance would be in Germany; how much it would be in conformity with the inclinations and general interests of the German people; and to what an extent it would rouse that national enthusiasm, which achieves such marvels in the hour of danger.

For the same reasons, an alliance with the minor confederate States of Germany would form a natural alliance for Austria. Can she, under all circumstances, place the same dependence on her Slavonians, Magyars, and Italians as on the German population? Must she not under *all* circumstances, as hitherto, derive her vigour

most especially from her German stock ? Were not the old contingent of the empire for many centuries, her truest and most efficient companions in arms against France, and even during the gloomy period of her rivalry with Prussia ? Is it not her natural policy to bind to herself the mass of small states ; for that purpose contributing her aid, to promote their utmost strength and prosperity ; seeing that they constitute her bulwark toward France. Not on slight grounds did the ancient imperial house, with so much energy, and with so many sacrifices, guard, during their protracted wars, the Rhenish frontier ; and with such stedfastness, till they could no longer, stretch the shield with the double eagle over Alsace and Lorraine, the endangered Palatinate, and the ecclesiastical principalities. The larger the mass of German States on the Rhine, the better for Austria ; the further France encroaches, so much the worse for her safety.

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If this aspect of the case be duly considered ; Mr Von Gentz's prayer against the restitution of Alsace to Germany in the year 1814 will appear very ill-advised. It could not have been Aus-

trian jealousy of Prussia, that caused this vexatious interference ; when a German country, about to be recovered from the French, would have been assigned either to Austria herself, or to some other German power not in any intimate connexion with Prussia. That Russia should zealously strive to maintain the strength of France on the Rhine, in order thereby to weaken Germany, was quite natural ; because Russia must dread much more any augmentation of the territory of Germany, her next neighbour, than a consolidation of the strength of France, which is more remote. But Austria had no interest identical with the Russian. She ought far rather to have extended the German confederation as widely as possible ; knowing that in every future European crisis, she would invariably find her stay and support in German nationality alone ; and that such an extension of the Confederacy would, within Germany itself, have added to the counterpoise against Prussia. Austria could have sustained no loss ; on the contrary, she would have been a gainer by such an enlargement of the Confederacy : indeed the former emperors were officially styled the enlargers of the empire.

This community of interest is the more undoubted, as, in spite of all mercantile and literary obstructions, and in spite of so many hostile tirades, from every quarter against Austria; cordial sympathies are ever cherished between the other inhabitants of Germany and those under Austrian rule. In fact, there is, in a certain sense, hardly a branch of the German family so popular, and regarded with so much affection by the rest, as the Tyrolese and the mild inhabitants of the banks of the Danube. A junction of Austria with the German Commercial League would tend greatly to increase these sympathies. On a dispassionate inquiry such will be found to be the only mode by which embarrassments can be avoided in future.

If ever an offensive alliance of Russia and France should be brought about; on which, as a probable occurrence, Mr Von Gentz, even in 1814, ought to have ventured to reflect, when he saw how keenly the Russian diplomatists strove to retain France in possession of Alsace; the cabinet of Vienna will not forbear lamenting the noted prayer of Von Gentz. In such an event Austria would

find the most intimate alliance with Prussia, and with the other Confederate States, to be an act of necessity ; and then would she be able to felicitate herself, if, by having concluded such an alliance beforehand, and by having upheld the interests of Prussia and the Confederate States against foreign aggression, every German sympathy had in return been secured.

P R U S S I A.

THE Prussian monarchy includes only a small part of Poland, and essentially rests on the basis of German nationality. This national unity of Prussia secures to her the same advantage enjoyed by England, Russia, and France; but of which Austria is destitute. Prussia, in fact, owns not more than a third of the geographical extent of territory, throughout which the German language is spoken. Yet in this third part, she has not only developed a wonderful degree of power, greatly beyond the proportion due from its size; but she has also, since the establishment of the commercial league (Zoll-verein), acquired strong sympathies in the rest of Germany; and, whenever Prussia identifies her own interests with the welfare of Germany,

she will obtain by these sympathies the active support of her countrymen. It is not to be denied that in Southern and in Western Germany, antipathies, to a certain extent, prevail against the so-called Prussianism. These antipathies, however, proceed entirely from adverse political principles; and the apprehension lest Prussia should raise up an interest, at variance with the general prosperity of Germany. But the struggle of principles never lasts long, when it interferes with questions of substantial gain; and the fear of Prussia, among other Germans, would speedily vanish in the hour of peril. Prussia would come forward to share every danger that might threaten the German nation.

As to the Slavonic part of the Prussian population, they unavoidably must be at length assimilated with the predominant German part. If the Slavonic population of Prussia were more numerous; they might possibly claim an independent existence such as the Hungarians enjoy. But it is singular that Brandenburg has never, in regard to her neighbours on the East, followed the policy of Austria, though the example came so near home. How much

more favourable would the situation of Brandenburg have been ; had the illustrious Princes of Hohenzollern conjoined with their hereditary States the two kingdoms of Poland and Lithuania,* just as the House of Hapsburg rules alike the two kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary ; and had they likewise bestowed on Livonia, Courland, and Esthonia, the same regard the house of Hapsburg has had, in the opposite direction, to Lombardy and the Dalmatian coast. The relations are so very similar, that Germans are strongly tempted to wish the policy of both houses had also been the same. But Brandenburg inherited the system of the Teutonic knights, who, as is well known, were enjoined to celibacy : consequently war, pillage, the conversion and civilization of their infidel vassals, were preferred ; and perhaps, with a regard to circumstances, must still be preferred, to the system followed by the House of Hapsburg, of increasing their dominions by marriage, and leaving undisturbed the various states from time to time so

* Another fate may be in reserve for Poland and Lithuania too, than continuing parcelled out among illustrious Houses, not Jagellons.—TR.

acquired.* From this system Prussia has at least derived the advantage of being able more freely to avail herself of German nationality.

Now, in truth, the German nationality is far from being represented by Prussia alone; and she has perhaps too much disregarded the growth of an anti-Prussian opposition in the rest of Germany. But who does not perceive, that any great impending danger, or general distress, would cast into oblivion the quarrels and petty jealousies produced by a long continuance of peace?

That Polish nationality itself likewise, so hostile to Germany, is, we know, still more inveterate against Russia. And here let us not forget the sage policy and wondrous fortune of Austria, so long and so faithfully served by heterogeneous nations, while employing their energy as her shield and protection, both against the Sultan and against the Czar.

Hence NATIONALITY must on every account be

* *Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube.*

viewed as a sustaining power of the Prussian monarchy ; and we hold it to be one of the most effectual supports of Prussia, though, on a first statistical comparison, it may be seen to be deficient.

On the contrary, the power of RELIGIOUS OPINION communicates not the slightest stability to Prussia : a singular fact, and well worthy of being scrutinized. Prussia is the natural heir of the Reformation ; the chief defender of Protestantism on the continent. This conspicuous part she assumed, when it was relinquished through the apostasy and feebleness of the electoral house of Saxony. Prussia became also the guardian of Calvinism when the power of Holland declined. That in her new position she should bring together the two great reformed parties was natural ; and a consequence of their mutual relations. The personal will of his majesty the king was in this matter identified with a historical law. The rigour against some old Lutherans ought perhaps to have been mitigated ;*

* According to whatever laws the Prussian government may have acted, there is understood to have been no excessive regard shewn for tender consciences.—Tr.

but does not call for particular notice as affecting the national welfare. By the conjunction of the two reformed churches, though there have been individual sufferings, the people at large have gained.

The Prussian government, while conferring greater external unity on their Protestant subjects; have not been equally attentive to the promotion of internal unity. By internal unity we do not here mean a uniformity of thoughts and feelings. In such an attempt, the Prussian government would, among an enlightened people, have failed in their aim; besides acting in opposition to the Protestant principle of free inquiry. Still they ought perhaps to have interfered less, either with the one sect or the other, in the uncontrolled adjustment of their belief and tenets: a far preferable course would have been to have left such things alone. By their open approbation of Hegel's philosophy, not a little encouragement has been given to the schism of Speculative theology and Pietism at this time threatening the evangelical church. Though Speculative theology may, in Prussia, continue to disguise its real object; yet what has already taken

place at Zurich, sufficiently demonstrates that such dogmatism is a mere relinquishment of Christianity, and only calculated to benefit a party from whom Prussia has nothing to expect.

Added to these dissensions among the Protestants, is the odious dispute with the Catholics ; a dispute ten years ago no one would have imagined possible ; but which nevertheless has suddenly re-kindled in our day all the passions exhibited in the middle ages, during the controversies about investiture. We shall not here enter more particularly into a subject so polemical ; and shall satisfy ourselves with remarking, that this religious discord weakens the position of Prussia externally, and keeps up mutual antipathies among her own population ;—operating not unlike a fatal move at chess made, as it were, by the evil demon of Germany, against the Commercial League, the move of Germany's good genius.

Thus, in ecclesiastical matters, which by right ought to have most contributed to the strength of Prussia, she exhibits only weakness.

POLITICAL PRINCIPLE must likewise on no account be considered a source of power to Prussia. Here she stands merely in the third rank ; deriving less advantage than Russia, and even than Austria, from the principles to which she adheres. Externally, it is evident that her principles attract no friends, save those who are linked still more closely with Austria and Russia. Indeed the political principles of Prussia excite antipathies, just where sympathy would be most desirable ; and where these antipathies, besides being political, are turned forcibly against her in every thing else.

These pages may be imagined to contain paradoxes, though, in reality, there are none ; and the opinion we are about to hazard may be thought equally absurd : it is, that, under a constitutional government, and at the head of all the constitutional States of Germany, connected with them not only by interest but by political principle ; Prussia would assume a position incomparably stronger and more formidable than she now occupies among absolute powers, ranking only third after Russia and

Austria.* Meanwhile we shall not pursue further a conception, at the present time, without doubt, perfectly idle. The following remark will suffice : The system of the militia (*landwehr*), and the municipal administration of Prussia, are institutions which presuppose one of these alternatives ;—either, in all time coming, a ruler universally beloved by the people ; or, the establishment of a general constitution for the whole kingdom.

The power of MATERIAL INTERESTS is, together with nationality, the strongest and most unfailing support of Prussia. The plan of a uniform scale of transit duties for the different States of Germany (the introduction of the *zoll-verein*), and the glorious campaign of the year 1815, shed a lustre over the long and memorable reign of the late king. The peaceful league and the warlike exploits have equally proved what may be effected by Prussia combined with the rest of Germany ; when the rest of Germany and Prussia join heart and hand. These two events, so well known and so unam-

* Most English readers will think the term "paradox," as here applied, somewhat of a misnomer.—TR.

biguous, contain a fund of political instruction for the future ministers of Prussia.

It is painful to reflect that the scheme of the Commercial League, which was in reality promised in the German act of confederation, had not been earlier introduced, and better digested.* What an advantage was thrown away by the cession of East Friesland to Hanover ! The very shore of the North Sea had been reached ; an acquisition which must now be purchased at so high a price. Still retrospect is fruitless, if for the mere object of collecting matter for unprofitable blame ; better far is it to deduce wisdom from experience, and to be thankful that coming prospects are more favourable : besides, there is now a greater probability

* The whole of the world's surface might be as compactly paved with such painful reflections, as another place is said to be with good intentions. Prussia has much more cause for gladness than for mourning when she views her actual position ; and as to her regrets about East Friesland, however well founded ; that ancient abode of freedom, though not now Prussian, has never ceased to be German ; and, along with every other part of Germany, will, sooner or later, understand the benefits of commercial concord.—Tr.

of the ultimate adhesion of Hanover herself to the Commercial League.

On the whole, Prussia is weaker than the other four leading powers of Europe; and, in the event of a continental war, her position would be threatened from more quarters than one. She has precisely the same natural enemies as Austria, and in England not so impartial a friend; the Commercial League being opposed to English interests.*

On account of the great extent of her frontier, and the limited breadth of her territory, Prussia could not successfully engage in war on the east and on the west at the same time; unless Austria and all the rest of Germany, together with England, were on her side. So long as Prussia continued jealous of Austria, and was less desirous to protect the smaller German States than to enlarge her dominions at their expense; she declined the

* No league to facilitate commercial intercourse can be really opposed to English interests; unless in said league there be a departure from the broad principle of free trade.

German alliance, and sought rather a connexion with France or Russia.

The French connexion was long a darling object of the Prussian government; and to her cost was realized at the peace of Basle in 1795. The Prussian statesmen flattered themselves that, by concluding their treaty, they had, in the first place, secured their country against an attack from France herself; secondly, that they would thereby be enabled to hold in check both Austria and Russia; thirdly, that with such aid they might clear away some of the smaller States in their neighbourhood, and so give more roundness to the Prussian territory. But all was a delusion. It is perfectly astonishing how any one could believe that France was serious in her friendship, and would honestly further the aggrandizement of Prussia. To France the Prussian alliance was never any thing but an artifice; a cunning method of disarming the one-half of Germany, so that there might be less trouble in crushing the other half, namely, Austria. Prussia was kept in play for the purpose of isolating her; she was reserved for a convenient opportunity,

when Austria had been completely despatched. It has been the invariable practice of the French to disunite the Germans from each other; and having thus become an overmatch for any single state, they have tried to beat them in detail. Never could they acquire this advantage on more reasonable terms, than when some cabinet allowed itself to be gained over as an ally, or to observe neutrality; while a neighbouring and kindred State was deliberately victimized.

The Prussians permitted themselves to be led away by the idea that France, as the oldest and most natural enemy of Austria, would gratefully receive and acknowledge their assistance in weakening that empire. But they forget that France has still more cogent reasons for hostility against Prussia herself; and must, at whatever risk, prevent the augmentation of her power. Prussia has the largest number of German subjects; indeed her subjects are almost exclusively German. She is essentially a German State; consequently more fit than Austria to represent the national interests of Germany, without regard to Italians, Hungarians, and Sla-

vonians ; and more likely to animate the Germans with zeal in her behalf. Prussia, moreover, has been gradually approaching the French confines, nay, has encamped on the very frontier ; while Austria has been withdrawing herself more and more from the vicinity of France, and has moved away to the east. Lastly, Prussia is a young and aspiring monarchy, far more inclined to aggression than the ancient and conservative empire of Austria. It must hence be evident that Prussia is a neighbour whose advancement France never can earnestly promote. Should the Prussian diplomatists at any future time relapse into such an error as the French alliance, continued from 1795 to 1806 ; they would fatally entangle their country, while the expiation would be more terrible than the last.

It is difficult to say any thing decisive regarding the position of Prussia with respect to Russia ; not only on account of the tender family connection which at present unites the two northern sovereigns ; but chiefly for this additional reason, that these States, a few years ago disjoined from each other by Poland, have now entered into different relations,

and which bring into view a host of future possibilities. For a long time it has been generally believed that Prussia and Russia are most intimately connected together, and due regard has not been paid to the incalculable results which would be produced by a collision of these States ; a turn of events, though not in immediate prospect, still not altogether beyond anticipation.

The alliance of Prussia with Russia has always from time to time been broken off by the tampering of Russia with other powers in a manner injurious and hostile to Prussia. Prussia first allied herself with Russia against Sweden at the beginning of the last century. Russia thereby acquired Livonia, and shortly after Courland ; while the gain to Prussia was insignificant. But scarcely had Russia established herself in Livonia, when she rapidly set about further encroachments, and tried even to grasp at the kingdom of Prussia. The former alliance through which Russia had made so large acquisitions, was ungratefully forgotten ; and by the notorious treaty of Versailles in 1756, she conjoined herself with Austria, France, Sweden, and Saxony,

for the purpose of overwhelming Prussia. A complete dismemberment was beforehand arranged ; and how nearly did the scheme succeed ! Almost the whole of Europe assailed the petty dominion of Prussia. A miracle seemed indispensable for her salvation ; and that miracle was wrought by the military genius of Frederick. But are such miracles always in readiness ? Can they be bespoken ?

Russia, ever bent on conquests in the west, after the failure of her scheme to destroy Prussia, undertook forthwith the partition of Poland ; and, to effect this object, she again entered into an alliance with Prussia ;—an alliance which continued for some time ; Russia requiring it for the second and third partitions of Poland. But Prussia having been discomfited and crippled by Napoleon, from her there was nothing more to fear or expect ; and the alliance was broken off. Russia at once leagued with Napoleon at Tilsit ; and not only raised no obstacle to the dismemberment of Prussia, but even appropriated a portion of the Prussian territory to herself ; leaving unfulfilled the stipulation of indemnity to Prussia for the loss of Hanover, though that indemnification formed one of the articles of

the treaty of Tilsit.* Soon after the conclusion of this treaty, Russia combined with Napoleon in a yet more formal manner at Erfurt, and divided with him the supremacy of Europe. By this second transaction she obtained Finland, and at the expense of Austria a part of Galicia: every thing favouring her designs of encroachment on the west. Meanwhile the catastrophe of 1812 put an end to

* The secret article of the treaty of Tilsit stipulated that, if Hanover were united with the new kingdom of Westphalia, Prussia should in return be indemnified by the cession of some other territory containing 400,000 inhabitants. Napoleon thought fit to join Hanover to Westphalia, *without* conferring any indemnification whatever on Prussia;† and the Emperor Alexander was so “magnanimous” as to write to him on the subject the following letter, which has been published by Bignon:—“Sire and Brother,—Moved by the friendship which your majesty has never ceased, on every occasion, to evince for me; and in order to give your majesty an incontestable proof of the friendship which I also entertain for you; I hasten to inform your majesty that I attach no importance to the fulfilment of the eventual article relating to Hanover.” Bignon remarks on this letter, that it is quite natural Russia should concur in the weakening of Prussia; but ‘by reason of’ his noble and delicate feeling for the so-much lauded Emperor Alexander, he yet terms this conduct “a cruel indifference” for his old friend.

† With regard to Hanover, Prussia at all events received her deserts.
—T₂.

Russo-Gallican amity ; Russia returned to the alliance of Prussia, by which she was placed in a condition to follow the Emperor of the French to Paris ; and, as an immediate result of the general success, she acquired the greater part of what had been Prussian Poland, along with the province of Warsaw ;—thus, as we see, continually advancing her frontier toward the west.

Since that time the Prusso-Russian alliance has continued seven and twenty years. Much has Prussia done for Russia, particularly in the last Polish war ; still she has been unable to obtain for her Baltic Provinces, even the smallest relief from the great annoyance to which they are subjected by the commercial prohibitions of the Russian government. We do not certainly attach any weight to the anonymous Russian pamphleteers who, in the Memoir for the year 1834, and in the work entitled, “ The European Pentarchy,” have endeavoured to excite among the smaller States of Germany antipathies against Prussia ; and who, with no friendly feeling to her, have proposed that the smaller States should place themselves under a Russian protec-

torate; yet even these writers admit that Russia has an interest at variance with the interest of Prussia.*

The neighbourhood of a staté, intelligent, renowned in war, still youthful, still aspiring, and backed by the whole vigour of German nationality; cannot be agreeable to the Russians, who, with a tendency to universal dominion, have hitherto enlarged their empire on every side; and are inclined to tolerate as neighbours the insignificant

* "The minor states composing the Diet, now saw plainly that neither Prussia nor Austria sufficiently guaranteed their existence as separate and independent sovereignties; and that the guardianship of either the one or the other must to them be always prejudicial. Their wish is to remain free; and not to descend to the rank either of Austrian or of Prussian provinces." From the Russian Memoir on the state of Germany in 1834, published in the Portfolio.

In "The European Pentarchy," p. 70, it is stated "Russia cannot countenance an aggrandizement of Prussia in Northern Germany;" and at p. 60, "a wider extent of territory is indeed required by the Prussian monarchy, in order to maintain that position which it now occupies." But the minor confederate states ought to be warned of this tendency of Prussia, and in their defence be persuaded to accept a Russian protectorate; because Russia never would consent to Prussian aggrandizement.

remains only of kingdoms, in earlier times so celebrated. What Sweden and Poland once were, that now is Prussia in a yet higher degree ; a knight in panoply who never quits his post on the bank of the Vistula, and who, though he may be entombed with the chivalry of yore, or effaced from the ancient escutcheon of Lithuania,* is ever ready to start again to life. This championship of the north Prussia has inherited ; and well is she worthy of the proud and glorious succession.

We have formerly, when treating of Austria, pronounced her intimate connexion with Prussia to be a political necessity : this necessity, it is our firm belief, will continue to become more and more evident, as the veil of futurity is withdrawn. Prussia, siding either with France or with Russia ; or even daring a combination with both ;† while

* The heraldic bearing of Lithuania was an armed warrior.—Tr.

† That what we have said is not mere fancy, is apparent from Pozzo di Borgo's despatch of 28th November 1828, printed in the Portfolio ; in which the scheme of an alliance of Russia with Prussia and France, against Austria, was really contemplated. All the endeavours of Metternich, it is

abandoning Austria to her fate, would only provoke her own destruction, as was evinced by the result of the treaty of Basle, namely, that other treaty afterwards concluded at Tilsit. Every impending danger hangs alike over Prussia and Austria. They stand each in need of mutual assistance. The author of the "Pentarchy" has himself made

there said, must prove ineffectual, Prussia being entirely devoted to Russia. "Prussia strengthens the ties of blood by those of policy"; and France knows her own interest too well to act unless in harmony with Russia. "If we display the front we ought and can display; the strongest party, as well as the Government of France, will court us; and, from the necessity of providing for their own welfare, will at once enter the lists, should Austria and England throw open the barriers." In the next sentence of the despatch it is remarked, that Prussia must be flattered with the prospect of acquisitions at the expense of England and Austria, so that she may the more readily attach herself to Russia and France. "Prussia has her part already assigned; the very objects of her ambition are within her grasp." This ambition would cost Prussia dear, were Austria previously subdued by Russia and France; indeed it would soon bring on the catastrophe of Prussia.

A more clumsy snare than the foregoing passage indicates, could hardly have been laid for Prussian policy. It is a complete affront to the diplomatic reputation of the cabinet of Berlin, to imagine them possessed of so little retrospective knowledge or foresight as to be thus easily outwitted.

this acknowledgment, when exulting that Russia occupies a position whence she can defy the menaces both of Austria and Prussia. "The Czar," says he, "by the acquisition of Poland, has gained a territory which cleaves Austria from Prussia, and for Russia is invaluable."

But an alliance with the rest of Germany is quite as necessary for Prussia as an alliance with Austria. In every great European contest, which to Prussia has always hitherto been a struggle for existence, it is indispensable for her to be upheld by the whole vigour of German nationality. In a war with France, the States of southern and western Germany are naturally leagued with Prussia; and she must prevent at any cost a renewal of the Confederation of the Rhine. But she can check the reappearance of such a confederation, only by a zealous support of the real interests of the minor States, and by identifying their interests with her own. It does not admit of doubt that the Commercial League of Prussia advances this noble object. Still the weak military position of southern Germany on the side of France is much to be la-

mented. From Strasburg, the French may in a few marches be in the heart of Swabia, and on the Danube. Prussia, as a military state, as the guardian of Germany, ought perhaps to have attached greater value to the proposal of making Strasburg a fortress of the German confederacy, in the same way as Wittenberg had been made Prussian. Every thing that contributes to expose the states of southern Germany to French invasion and to French influence is alarming to Prussia. The great Elector knew well how requisite to his country was the preservation of the Upper Rhine. Hardenberg would seem not to have been so well aware of the fact. The minor German States are dangerous to Prussia only when they are the allies of France; and they have never yielded themselves to so anti-national a procedure, except when, themselves defenceless, they could discover no other means of salvation.

In addition to the ease with which the French can from Strasburg operate on Upper Germany, there are many well known sympathies in favour of the liberal principle now ascendant in France;

sympathies which, almost as a matter of course, appear to be accompanied by an antipathy for the opposite principle avowed by Prussia :—a truth highly disagreeable to every German who understands the necessity of a cordial and unreserved adjustment of the particular interests of all the German States. Undoubtedly the conflict of principles is no longer active ; but who can decide whether the flame will not burst out anew ? and then what an advantage might not a foreign enemy derive from the civil discontents of Germany ? This consideration leads naturally to the wish, that Prussia may do her best to obtain satisfaction of all the just and reasonable demands made by the German people, for example in Hanover ; so that distrust may be banished, and confidence restored. With reference to these discontents, the policy of the Commercial League is yet incomplete. The minor States are attracted to foreign powers only in proportion as they are detached from Austria and Prussia.

THE
MINOR CONFEDERATE STATES
OF GERMANY.

The smaller states of Germany have entertained a continual dread of being overpowered and swallowed up, at one time by Austria, at another time by Prussia. Hence they have always endeavoured to benefit by the jealousy of these two powers ; and, guided by circumstances, have allied themselves either with Austria against Prussia, as in the Seven years' war ; or with Prussia against Austria, in the so-called League of the Princes. This policy is natural, and of no recent date. It was the policy adopted by the smaller states of the empire, whenever two dynasties in Germany, with large territorial possessions, were opposed to each other.

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It was the policy which, as is well known to every reader of history, the petty princes and the imperial cities followed, during the rival contentions of the Guelfs with the Ghibbelines, of the Hapsburgers with the Wittelsbachers, and of the Hapsburgers with the Luxemburgers. Had not foreign powers intermeddled; these internal quarrels among the Germans would be undeserving of notice. If by these quarrels the unity of the nation was weakened; the evils of uniformity were by the same means warded off. The various [tribes] reciprocally preserved a due equilibrium. Their nationality secured to itself distinct rallying points; so that the rich and beautiful country of Germany cannot, like France, be carved out for the behoof of one all-absorbing metropolis.

Disastrous to Germany has been the interference of foreign powers. Still it redounds to the honour of the secondary princes of the empire, that in almost every instance, they have invited foreign aid, only when compelled by extreme necessity; or they have yielded to overwhelming external force. Necessity was the motive in the religious wars.

The Protestant princes applied for relief to France after they had been vanquished in the field by the Catholic party, and were menaced with their insufferable tyranny. The agency was Force, when the minor princes, being deserted by Prussia, and finding Austria incapable to restore victory, were left without any alternative but prompt submission to the mandates of Napoleon. Only once, and much to the detriment of Germany, did Bavaria heedlessly and voluntarily join with France under Louis XIV.

But every foreign mediation has been prejudicial to the German people, and has tended to diminish the general strength of the nation. The French owe all their earlier successes in Germany to the mutually destructive conflicts of popular parties among the Germans, or to the reciprocal enmity of the various cabinets. When the Germans ranged themselves as Guelfs and Ghibbelines (partizans of the Pope and of the Emperor), the French wrested Artois and Burgundy from the German Empire. Again, when the Germans were divided into Leaguers and Reformers; the French laid hold of

Alsace ; secured the friendship of the Swiss ; and obtained a commanding influence in Italy, where the enfeebled Emperors redeemed their authority only by permitting Lorraine to revert to France. At a later period, the unhappy jealousies between Austria and Prussia afforded the French many an opportunity of exercising a malign control over Germany ; and nothing but the despicable policy of Louis XV., and his chamber councils, prevented their fully availing themselves of these opportunities. But so soon as France, by the revolution, was again placed under an energetic government, one that understood admirably how to profit by the follies of the greater German powers ; Austria and the Empire were isolated, while Prussia was cajoled at the treaty of Basle ; and immediately after, France achieved boundless success, gaining possession of Holland and the Netherlands, the whole left bank of the Rhine, and Switzerland.

The glorious war of 1813 drove back the French ; but the new condition of Germany still bears much resemblance to the old. The mutual relations of the different parts of that country continue nearly

the same as they have been. There are two great powers, always to a certain extent viewed as rivals; and there is still a mass of smaller States, whose existence is preserved by means of the equilibrium between their more potent neighbours.

Nevertheless, the common danger which had been escaped, and the general triumph which was obtained, produced a strong impression; while now the dread of foreign interference neutralizes the jealousies which survived. Such is the deportment of the rulers of Germany toward each other, that there is no longer fear of internal usurpation; and consequently, no chance of the German union falling asunder, as the author of the "Pentarchy" desires. The silly wish of the Russian pamphleteer* could

* The stupidity is quite amusing. The Memoir, circulated in 1834 among the minor German courts, attempted to excite their hatred against the absolutism and stability which form the political principles of Austria, as "not being of exalted character, and ill adapted to the present age." But to what principle, then, does Russia do homage? That same Memoir endeavoured to attract suspicion toward Prussia, representing her as desirous of gradually reducing the other States of Germany by means of her Commercial League.

If the Russian pamphleteers have the assurance to employ

not in fact have been disclosed at a more unsuitable time. In spite of many anomalous interests ; throughout Germany men now possess stronger inducements, and more than ever exhibit a disposition, with German calmness, thoughtfulness, and sound judgment, to come to an understanding in regard to those interests which most universally affect them ;—as, among other things, has been proved by the happy beginning and progress of the Commercial League.

Hence the invitation the author of the “Pentarchy” gives to the smaller States, to enact a felony against the German union, by constituting, of themselves, a new independent Rhenish league, or, as he styles it, a European central association ; is not insolent only, and a direct summons to breach of faith, but is likewise politically a miscalculation.

† We shall not avoid the real question. Some of the smaller States, it is true, often displayed high

language so ungrateful with respect to Prussia ; what confidence can be reposed on Russia by the smaller States of Germany, who have merited far less at her hands ?

expectations, when combining with foreign powers against the rest of Germany. But on the whole, the system of roundings of territory has been injurious to the smaller States; and the return of the ancient system of equilibrium has alone rescued them from perdition. Every general rounding has diminished the mass of the small States, which form the great fund drawn on for acquisitions and indemnifications. Even the few small States individually favoured in the partitions, have still not become sufficiently powerful to maintain themselves unassisted. Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and Hanover, have been separately amplified; but the geographical extent of the countries originally included within the empire has been reduced. Austria, Prussia, France, Holland, and Denmark, have torn away large portions; so that the remnant has no longer the political weight the confederate imperial States possessed, when Prussia tendered the League of the Princes. Consequently, though there may have been single gains of an additional half million of inhabitants, the confederacy has lost eight millions; and the power of the minor States has thus not been aug-

mented but lessened: the case of Saxony, too, proves that an individual State whose wings have been long growing, may have them clipped at last. The general roundings are for the small States a lottery; in which no doubt singly they may win; but afterwards they must repeatedly risk their winnings, and incur the danger of losing all; for in the long run the whole stake comes into the hands of the larger powers: and it would be well for the small States, that by a secure settlement of the internal affairs of Germany, they were never constrained to hazard their existence in this perilous game.

The losses sustained by the German States, as a whole, have been most severe in the west. Upper Germany is continually threatened from Strasburg, and in the event of a war, would be subjected to the most painful sacrifices; perhaps would be again compelled feloniously to desert the German Confederacy. This exposure to attack is a manifest obstruction to the safety and independence of the Minor Associated States. The position of these States cannot be secure, till the Vosges again mark the confines of Germany; and Strasburg once more

becomes a German fortress, garrisoned by the Confederates. In addition to the actual danger from Strasburg; France has never relinquished the expectation of some day possessing the whole left bank of the Rhine. Were this expectation ever realized; not only would Bavaria be deprived of the Palatinate; but the French would exert beyond the Rhine an influence on the residue of the Minor Confederate States of Germany, who would be condemned to a new vassalage, should they escape being swept away by a final consolidation, and a partition of their respective territories among the larger powers.

France has at all times been ready, according as it happened to be most for her advantage, either to flatter the numerous petty princes with hopes of absolute authority, or to excite the people of Western Germany with prospects of a republican government and Utopian dreams of freedom. However clumsy the contradiction; still the Germans have often been so simple as allow themselves to be deceived. In proportion as the petty princes seemed unwilling to confide in a French protecto-

rate; France invariably became more urgent in addressing herself to the liberalism of the populace.

We believe they are in error who have supposed that in the character of the constitutional governments of Germany, there is a secret tendency to Radicalism. We are much rather inclined to think that the Germans are by nature most conservative: so much so, that we are convinced French influence on the political feeling of Germany, will diminish in the same degree as reliance is placed on the character of the German constitutions: on the other hand, we maintain that political distrust will only serve to augment the predominance of France.

Along with these considerations, the Hanoverian question necessarily obtrudes itself. The affairs of Hanover are by themselves clearly too unimportant to have any effect on the general policy of Europe. But on the decision of the constitutional question in Hanover, depends in a great measure the future credit of modern constitutional governments: this question therefore operates for-

cibly on the confidence or suspicion which may prevail in regard to the internal policy of Germany.

Confidence would appear to be a union of satisfaction and loyalty ; hence thoroughly conservative. Such confidence, moreover, seems to us to promote the increase of that moral strength which we never see disappear from public life, without being followed by a merited penalty. Granting that the people of such parts of Northern and Eastern Germany, as have not yet been habituated to constitutional forms, take no interest in this political progress, and that their confidence may be settled on a different basis ;—yet it is not to be misunderstood, that the western populations must either be strengthened and confirmed in their adherence to the system of national representation, established among them many hundred years ago, and which, though suspended at times during the last century, has now been restored and purified, so as to suit the altered exigencies of this age ; or otherwise, that the risk is incurred of these western populations relapsing into indifference, which would only be

conducive to the growth of French ascendancy, whenever a European crisis shall arrive.

The opposition of the Radicals in England to the Whigs, and of the Republicans in France to the Conservative chambers; even the slight schism in Germany between the revolutionary youth, and their constitutional seniors, displayed immediately after the July revolution at Paris; make known the direction in which men's opinions would wander, if reliance on constitutional authority should be extinguished. Without doubt, there is not the smallest reason to apprehend that the German nation, of whom a vast majority are still peaceable and loyal, can be seriously disturbed or excited by any internal movements of Radicalism; but, in the event of a European crisis, political indifference or distrust would infallibly weaken the moral and national vigour of Western Germany, and would render the frontiers accessible to French intrigues.

In whatever way the affairs of France may

henceforward be regulated; danger will always, from that quarter, menace the German Confederates. It may happen that France will be wasted by intestine commotions; or, like Spain, sink into lethargy; but such a termination is not to be anticipated. Only two results are probable. Either the revolutionary principle must again obtain the upper hand, and once more throw all Europe into commotion, reviving discontent everywhere; or the monarchy will rise superior among parties in France, and become strong enough to engage, as formerly, in external operations. In the first case the question arises, whether the French would not again, as in 1792 and in 1830, be more or less aided by sympathies within Germany itself? All history and precedent shew us, that the assistance the French offer in the name of liberty is a mere pretext; and designed only as a means of foreign conquest and subjugation.

When the German Protestants allowed themselves to be supported by the French; they came under the yoke of that despotism which Louis the XIV. exercised in Lorraine and Alsace, per-

sonally, and in the other States of Germany by the force of his example. When the German Illuminati, Cosmopolites, and Friends of Freedom, intoxicated with admiration of the great French Revolution, permitted themselves to be backed by the French in 1792; they by no means obtained that freedom they had expected, but were brought under the absolute sway of Napoleon and of the sovereigns of the Rhenish Confederation. Should the Liberals, or even the Religious party, in Germany, accept at any future time the aid of the French, in whatever manner such aid may be given; they will not experience a better fate. The interest of France is merely to weaken Germany; and this interest never varies under any change of political principles. As kingdom, as republic, as empire, conquest is her sole aim in Germany. Thus even now the republican party in France is less eager about the triumph of their political principles, than about war and victory. They dream less of Brutus than of Cæsar. Though the flame at present smoulders among the ashes; any unlooked for event, any change in the person of their ruler, or serious mistake of the Go-

vernment, proceeding from arrogance or from imbecility, would revive a general conflagration.

As the example of the French people has often electrified other nations; so, on the other hand, would the French themselves be electrified by any kind of national movement elsewhere. If a new volcano were to burst out in Germany; the old pre-existing volcano in France would reassume activity. But if none of these things come to pass; if every trace of combustion should be extinguished; then, doubtless, would the Orleans family succeed in establishing their sway; and not only inspire the Russian diplomacy with that confidence, which the pamphleteer, to whom we have so often alluded, makes the first condition of an alliance; but it would also coincide with their peculiar interest, to return to the cabinet policy of Louis the XIV. and Napoleon; and, under the favourable auspices of the Russian alliance, to occupy with projects of foreign conquest, the ambitious and ever-warlike Frenchmen; to flatter them with the hopes of new victories, and the certainty of regaining the left bank of the Rhine, &c. This state of things would the

more inevitably be produced ; if in Germany itself encouragement were given to dissatisfaction, restlessness, and mutual jealousy.

Consequently, France can never be the true friend and supporter of the Minor States: from her contiguity, she is rather their most dangerous enemy. The welfare of these states urgently demands, that France be permitted to encroach on them no further ; on the contrary, if in any way it were possible, that she should be driven back again beyond the Vosges, and the still small confederacy strengthened by the annexation of Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland. The interests of Austria, Prussia, and the Minor States, entirely correspond ; since, for these large sovereignties, an augmentation of the number and aggregate strength of the smaller states, is incomparably less dangerous than an aggrandizement of France.

Hitherto, whenever foreign powers wished to array the small German states against Austria or Prussia ; they always addressed themselves, in the first place, to the court of Munich. If this method

of procedure be attentively examined; it will be seen to be a circumstance highly important for Germany, and well deserving national gratitude; that the present king of Bavaria has so often and decidedly declared his German patriotism, and his strong dislike of all foreign interposition in the affairs of Germany.

The independence of the Minor States is indissoluble from the permanence of the German Confederacy. Should a breach once be made in that Confederacy; then would the thrones totter, and the constitutions go down; then would there be a renewal of the tyranny and official insolence of strangers; foreign troops would again banish prosperity and freedom; German nationality itself would be threatened. Let every western and southern German clearly understand what awaits him, should Austria and Prussia no longer support the national cause. Under Napoleon, the French empire stretched right across Germany, beyond the Elbe and the Weser, even to the Baltic; exhibiting, to the astonishment of the old East Frieslanders, French prefects, French custom-house officers, and

French police spies. On the other side, Russia, even in the Seven years' war, would gladly have laid hold of the kingdom of Prussia: indeed Königsberg was actually in her possession. More recently, as Bignon informs us, she negotiated with Napoleon for Bohemia; without Austria knowing anything about the arrangement. What would happen were Germans again taken by surprise, before they had become convinced of the necessity of a united resistance?—were they, a second time, compelled to bear the evils of dissension and foreign rule? What would be their fate; should the barriers of German nationality give way on either side, before the wily assaults of Russia, or the impetuosity of France?

It would seem not to have been sufficiently considered how deep are the obligations of all Germany to Austria, for her powerful defence and guardianship of their south-western boundary. Here Germans still bear sway over men of divers lineage; as in the olden time was the case along the whole extent of the German frontier. Here no exotic influence is to be dreaded. No Strasburg exists in

this quarter. Here no kindred village languishes under foreign domination. But what a change would ensue, were this bulwark of German independence overthrown,—had its fall arisen from the extinction of national sympathy, and from German malevolence! If, in the one direction, Russia succeeded in establishing herself on the Danube; at the same time that France acquired the ascendant on the Po, ready to march against Germany through Carinthia, as in 1797: while, in the other direction, Prussia, similarly deserted by her Catholic subjects on the Rhine and in Westphalia; involved in internal commotions; and denied the assistance of her fellow-countrymen; was overpowered by a Russian and French coalition:—would the inhabitants of Southern Germany have much cause to rejoice over this humiliation of Austria and Prussia? Would their own doom then be far off?

The Germans have already seen the Russians on St Gothard; and the French at Dantzic. That the Erfurt alliance caused them no greater injury, was an ordination of Providence; of the same Pro-

vidence which has bestowed on them judgment, enabling them to deduce instruction for the future from an experience of the past.

In particular, it must not be misunderstood, that against the Germanic influence which for more than a thousand years has been predominant in Europe, a momentous historical reaction has, during the last century, been in progress; on the one side, from the Romanic influence of France; on the other, from the Slavonic influence of Russia.* Both these more recent influences continue to press forward. Both, after intervals of repose, have always seized, or found again, an opportunity to make acquisitions at the cost of the intermediate influence of Germanism. On the one hand, Germany has been bereft of Alsace and Lorraine; on the other, the Baltic provinces have been alienated. Napoleon grasped still more on his side; and so early as the Seven years' war, Russia displayed her insatiable temper. In language, moreover,

* As a counterpoise, the same century also witnessed the full expansion of German literature.—Tr.

and in fashions too, the Romanic influence has, through the prevailing French taste, even in Germany itself, long maintained a degree of superiority over the Germanic influence. In the opposite direction also, Slavonic influence has diffused itself, supplanting German manners, and announcing its future triumphs to be gained by the extinction of German nationality. Under these circumstances, all the powers who essentially depend on their Teutonic character, ought to be aware that, in each further partition and weakening of the collective body of the German people, every one, without exception, the small as well as the great, is vitally concerned.

A separation of Prussia from Austria would, in any great European crisis, be equally destructive to both; even though one of them should be aggrandized by the ruin of the other: for thus either France or Russia would be aggrandized in a still larger proportion; and prove, to the survivor of the two, incomparably more dangerous than before. Such was the situation of Prussia after deserting Austria in 1805.

But a separation of the smaller German States from Austria and Prussia, with the view of forming a new Confederation of the Rhine; whether again under the protection of France, or under a newfangled Russian protectorate, as advised by the author of the "Pentarchy"; would, beyond doubt, lead to their utter ruin. For, admitting that such new confederation, by the aid of France or of Russia, or by the aid of both powers, should contribute to the weakening or to the overthrow of Austria and Prussia; and that this Anti-German coalition should triumph as in 1805, 1806, and 1809, would such a triumph be attended by the same results? It is impossible to calculate on a repetition of the wonderful events of 1813 and 1815. The supremacy of foreign conquerors and protectors would not again disappear so soon from the German soil; but would probably be riveted with an iron force, and disguised with multiform attractions. Then would the new Confederation of the Rhine experience a change of a different kind;—degraded to the most ignominious vassalage; and annihilated by their own decree, the first and last act of their political existence.

It is of equal importance to Russia and France, that the small German States should be, as much as possible, independent of Austria and Prussia; at least so long as Austria and Prussia are of themselves powerful. If the power of Austria and Prussia were to come to an end; the demolition of the small states would be a very short process.

Let us reflect on the events previous to the Congress of Vienna, by which the new arrangements in Germany were established: we shall then be able to calculate for the future; and judge how far the Minor States, by hitherto over-exclusively occupying themselves with their own internal politics, and with disputes in reference to constitutional principles, have lost sight of that Germanic unity which forms the basis of their existence. But, on the other hand, there have been omissions in what was requisite to connect the hopes and sympathies of the minor with the larger States. Had Austria and Prussia come forward earnestly to help to disentangle the question of the Hanoverian Statutes;—or had the leading Catholic States endeavoured in a friendly manner to extricate Prussia

from her embarrassments, regarding the matter of the Archbishop of Cologne; in order, with sincere patriotism, to remove every baneful Romanish influence likely to disturb the general welfare of Germany; an object which was perfectly attainable:—national confidence, so much diminished by internal heartburnings, would everywhere have been restored;—the German Confederacy would have become more powerful in their foreign relations; and their expressed opinion would have carried weight even in Eastern affairs.

At present these remarks may be thought to partake of simplicity: but we are entering on an uncertain future, during which, as at every former period, tempests of overwhelming violence will continue to burst over Germany.

In these latter days were any of the able politicians of antiquity—let us suppose Demosthenes—to rise from his grave, and survey the actual condition of the world; what opinion would he give on the situation of Germany? Might he not thus speak?—To conjoin in a hearty and enduring al-

liance Austria and Prussia, who have so often fought against each other, and have so long been swayed by mutual jealousy; would be difficult.—The Minor States having already twice formed a Rhenish Confederation under a French protectorate; to withhold them in all circumstances from a third combination, and from being similarly misled; would be also difficult.—To bring back Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland exclusively to German interests; would be an attempt still more arduous.—To check the employment of religious schisms by foreign powers, for disquieting and weakening the German Confederacy; would be nearly impracticable.—To satisfy the political dreams and expectations of the people; to sooth discontent; to quell the antipathies entertained against domestic forms of government, and to banish so many likings for foreign modes of rule; to animate with reciprocal confidence the various races, who for hundreds of years have been actuated by bitter enmity, who still revile and hate each other; and to gain them over to a sacrifice of their narrow provincial questions for the advancement of the general welfare of Germany;—seem all to be tasks

equally hopeless. Yet these alarming obstacles must be overcome, if Germany would not sink into utter decay. Should these obstacles prove insurmountable, nature will infallibly resume her course;—in other words, the lax national association of Germany must, sooner or later, yield to the combined efforts of its strongly consolidated neighbours on the East and on the West. France alone in 1792 laid Germany prostrate by force of arms. Russia alone in 1814 reduced her by diplomacy. If ever both these powers act in concert; then, we repeat, it would be a work of exceeding difficulty to guard the German nation from the most severe calamities.

The Greeks, he would continue, were a noble, a mighty, and a highly civilized nation:—but they perished because of their disunion. The Germans, who are a nation not less noble, mighty, and civilized, must also perish;—because, like the Greeks, they are disunited.

HOLLAND, BELGIUM, SWITZERLAND.

THE small territories which are situated between the German confederacy and France, once formed part of the German Empire ; and still nature enjoins their re-annexation to Germanic nationality, and to the brotherhood of the German States. On the one side ; they are menaced by a foreign people, great, united, and thirsting for conquest ; to whom they have once already fallen a prey, and from whose dominion they were liberated only by the German arms in 1813 : at which period these small territories were attached to the French Empire ; even Switzerland, ostensibly uncontrolled, being in complete dependence on France : and for the freedom now enjoyed by them, they are indebted to the victories of Leipsic and Waterloo.

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On the other side ; is the German nation, to which the Netherlands and the Swiss really belong ; and their immediate neighbours are that confederacy of small kindred states, in no way formidable to them ; security, not conquest, being the purpose of the union.

The Netherlands and Switzerland possess European importance, only when France succeeds in making these countries the basis of her armaments against Germany ; an object she has at all times been eager to accomplish, on undertaking a German war. An alliance with the Swiss or an occupation of Switzerland, and a seizure of the Netherlands, have invariably been the steps with which France has sought to commence operations ; in order that she might gain the first advantage, by outflanking Germany both on the west and on the south. The German confederacy, by its nature merely defensive, has never been sufficiently prompt to forestall France. The Netherlands and Switzerland have been respected by the German powers ; who, for the defence of Germany itself, have sought to maintain unimpaired the neutrality of these se-

condary states. Only when this neutrality has been violated by France, have the German powers come forward.

But now France possesses the means, and without direct occupation, avails herself of every opportunity, to make each little bordering country a dependent of her own. For this reason, it is of great moment for the German confederacy, in every way to befriend the Netherlands and Switzerland; so that, by means of German sympathies, the French influence may be weakened. In the Belgian question sufficient regard was not bestowed on this point. Belgium must be viewed by Germany only as a German bulwark against France; and nothing must be left undone to render Belgium available for that object. On the same account the interest of Holland must be postponed to the larger interests of Germany. Belgium too must ascribe her independence, her wealth, and her future prospects, not to France; but to the German confederacy, and to her close union with German nationality.

Holland is placed in a peculiar relation to Rus-

sia. It would be far more desirable, and for Holland herself ultimately more beneficial, were she in more familiar connexion with Germany; and were Germany again the source of her power. Holland has isolated herself too much within her narrow provincialism. Holland forms the anchoring ground for German navigation. If, as at the beginning of her fortunate career, she had always drawn fresh vigour from the inland districts of Germany, and had not preferred to shrink within her own confined territory; instead of losing her colonies to the English, she would have augmented their number.

At present both these petty kingdoms are estranged from German interests. Belgium is more resigned to the influence of France; Holland to the influence of Russia.

“Truly,” says Arendt in his excellent work,* “when we contemplate the demeanour of Germany toward Belgium since the July revolution; we

* The Interests of Germany in regard to the Belgian Question. Brussels, 1839.

might suppose Germany had discovered, that relatively to her own interests, she could follow no better course in Belgium, than to urge the Belgians to throw themselves into the arms of France ; and thereby constrain them to forget their origin, and to sever those numerous ties by which they are bound to Germany. We say constrain them ; and we adhere to the expression. For, with a blindness which is unpardonable ; and of which the only explanation can be, the strong prejudices of German politicians, and their unwillingness to yield to any sort of reasoning ; the fact has in Germany been quite overlooked, that in Belgium itself, this great and exclusive approximation to France, is not in the least degree national ; that the Belgians as a people desire, above all things, to maintain an independent existence ; and that a large majority of them would prefer a German connection to every other. Germans are convinced of the necessity of preventing a foreign influence from gaining the ascendant in Belgium ; yet for the fulfilment of so patriotic an object ;—one of the most urgent duties imposed on them by the external relations of their country ;—every thing has been done to render the influence

of Germany in Belgium as slight as possible, and eventually to destroy it altogether.”

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We conceive the Belgian question to be, more than any other, a *boundary question* between Germany and France. However multifarious the secondary interests; the political and strategical questions involved in a military frontier are beyond comparison the most weighty. From time immemorial, the estimation of Belgium in *this* respect has been pre-eminent. A rapid historical sketch will best elucidate the opinion now offered.

Even so early as the first dawn of Belgian history, Belgium had already become German. Cæsar distinguished the Belgians as Germans, from the Gauls dwelling further to the west and to the south; and the districts they inhabited were of even larger extent than Belgium of the present day. The Romans, immediately on their acquiring the dominion of Gaul, became aware of the strategical importance of Belgium. Their first solicitude was to strengthen themselves in that quarter; and from thence to outflank Germany. They attached

much higher value to the possession of Belgium, than to the subjection of the countries on the Danube; though these countries lay much nearer to Italy;—knowing well that the Danubian territory would, at an after time, fall spontaneously into their hands, as soon as they had reduced the warlike tribes of Germany on the lower Rhine. Besides, it must not be allowed to pass unnoticed, that the loss of Belgium occasioned to the Romans the further loss of Holland and Friesland; a result which has occurred in later times also; plainly shewing that Holland has ever been overcome, when a superior power, holding possession of Gaul, has effected a lodgment in Belgium.

Immediately on the commencement of the great Germanic reaction against the authority of the Romans; Belgium was the first Roman Province occupied and peopled anew by the advancing Germans. Ere the Goths had migrated into the empire,—ere the Allemanni had seized Switzerland and Alsace,—the Salic Franks were already established in Flanders and Brabant. Proceeding from these early settlements of his race, the first Louis

conquered Gaul: thus Flanders and Brabant formed the basis of the mighty empire acquired by the Carolingians. Nothing can more clearly illustrate the value of their political and strategical position between Germany and France.

The new kingdom of the Franks, the *Neustria* torn off from the great Carolingian domain, continued at first politically insignificant alongside the German Empire. But no sooner did the Emperor quarrel with the papal power, and the empire itself fall into confusion from the rebellion of the native aristocracy, than France was enabled to devise her scheme of enlargement at the expense of Germany; and, by placing herself next to the empire, to substitute in room of the old European system of unity, where the emperor alone predominated, the system of a political equilibrium oscillating among the chief European powers.* But although Flanders passed under the nominal sovereignty of the French kings; when the Franks who

* A most beneficial change for the progress of European civilization; therefore most of all to Germany; for which, as would appear, mankind are indebted to France.—Tt.

had migrated into Gaul became Romanized, she again ranged herself on the side of the Germans. The German Flemings remained perfectly distinct from the Romanish Walloons; and their repugnance toward the foreign language and dominion, was the true cause of all their numerous revolts against the French monarchy. To slay all who spoke Walloon, was a frequent watchword in their battles and civic commotions. The intrepid German population withstood in many a memorable conflict the might and subtlety of France. In the fourteenth century, though very feebly aided by the distracted empire, their individual courage guarded its right flank, that inestimable bulwark of Western Germany.

The frontier defence of Germany, Belgium, remained; till, through the deplorable error of the emperor Charles V., having been committed to his son Philip, it was brought under the thralldom of Spain. The Dutch cast off the yoke of that insufferable tyranny. The Belgians continued Spanish; an evidence of their having no desire to become French, in spite of every allurements held out to them from

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that quarter. In the mean time, France saw the consequences which would ensue on the separation of Belgium from Holland ; namely, a dissolution of that power which, when combined, had in one direction successfully opposed all her efforts. She saw Belgium isolated ; and less supported in her rear than menaced by Holland. Thus emboldened, she repeatedly renewed her attempts on Belgium ; which, during all her hostilities against Spain and Germany, was invariably the chief object of attack. The blood shed throughout the Netherlands in the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. is corroborative of our assertion. To gain or to hold possession of Belgium has been the first and the last question in every war between France and Germany.

When France, through her revolution, reached instantaneously a gigantic strength, competent to defy all the sovereigns of Europe ; she flung herself on Belgium, and wrested that province from Germany as more desirable than every other. Scarcely was her conquest secure, when Holland fell,—Holland, which hitherto had always found herself

protected by the fortunate interposition of Belgium. Whenever Belgium became French, Holland alone could not retain her independence. The same effect had been produced in the time of the Romans; nor can the result in future ever be different. Thus may Holland be taught the lesson, how deeply she is herself interested in preserving Belgium as much as possible exempt from French control.

When the great national movement began in Germany against the dominion of France; Belgium, along with Holland, as they had been the first German countries seized by the French, were also the first delivered; and partly indeed they delivered themselves. After the submission of France; the allied troops set to watch the French, and to guard Germany from any new dangers threatened from thence, were still concentrated in Belgium only; and in Belgium, by the final overthrow of Napoleon, the fate of Europe was decided.

Now, if we hold steadily in view the strategical importance of Belgium, which for two thousand years has continued unaltered; it must be acknow-

ledged to have been a most natural and practical resolution on the part of the German powers, and their allies against France, to confer on Belgium a greater ability to withstand in future every French invasion. But since it was manifest that this ability had at a former time been impaired by the disjunction of Belgium from Holland ; the plan immediately occurred to unite them again, and thus re-establish the former imposing kingdom of the Netherlands ; which, if hearty in the cause, was perfectly qualified to bear the first shock of French impetuosity, and to second the Prussian efforts on the Rhine. Had an exclusively military view been taken of the projected arrangement ; and had it not been determined according to other political considerations ; Belgium would have been united, not with an adjoining small state, but with a large and neighbouring German power ; consequently with Prussia :* a measure which would have been the more conformable to the original design ; since the population of Belgium harmonizes infinitely more with the population of Rhenish Prussia, than

* For Prussia an acquisition more desirable even than Hanover.—Tr.

with the Dutch. A restoration of Belgium to Austria would, on military principles, have been unjustifiable. Austria might, on the same ground, have sought to reclaim the whole of ancient Burgundy, Lorraine, and Alsace; and thereby establish a compact power on the left bank of the Rhine. A resuscitation of the Austrian Netherlands alone, would, on the contrary, have been a mere renewal of all the inconsistencies which experience has taught us to avoid. That province would have been found much too far removed from the centre of the Austrian power, to be left as a forlorn station for purposes either military or political.

The union of Belgium with Holland did not contradict the expectations which had been formed regarding it. The more earnestly endeavours were made from without, to unite them to each other; the more violently did the mutual repugnance of the populations of both countries display itself within. The question whether that repugnance might have been neutralized, is henceforth superfluous. The separation has been effected; and is now beyond remedy. Such having been the deci-

sion ; for the strategical reasons previously assigned, no choice could have been more in accordance with the welfare of Germany, than to have united Belgium to Prussia. But in the year 1831, from political considerations, such a measure was perhaps still less practicable than in 1815. Belgium has been constituted an independent kingdom.

This innovation is, on strategical grounds, hazardous to the safety of Germany, in the event of a war with France. If Belgium, when connected with the distant indeed, yet powerful Austria, was ill adapted to form the north-western frontier, the right flank, of Germany ; a small kingdom, quite distinct, and in noway belonging to the German confederacy, seems still less capable of fulfilling such a design. But the security of the frontiers of Germany is an object of which Germans must never lose sight.

The particular situation Belgium now occupies resembles that of the kingdom of Sardinia. But Sardinia, as is well known, was, from her position, unceasingly condemned to the trammels of a faithless and versatile policy. When Germany was

successful elsewhere; the aid of Savoy was of little benefit, and cost but a share of the spoil. When Germany was unsuccessful; Savoy instantly veered about, and helped to plunder her former allies. Belgium, in circumstances so much alike, can hardly adopt any other system. At the present time Sardinia has no weight, except in Italian affairs; and as regards the welfare of Germany, her conduct is immaterial: while the policy of Belgium would operate directly on German interests.

Holding always in view the military necessity of retaining the most efficacious bulwark of Germany against France; it behoves Germans to inquire how Belgium may, in her actual position as a distinct kingdom, be made available for securing an object so important.

The proceeding which would be most advantageous for Germany is, that Belgium should connect herself with the German confederacy; and as an integral portion of that confederacy, aid the defence of the military frontier, acquiring in return, the full support of the confederacy for the promo-

tion of her individual objects as apart from France. Though such a union may at this moment be unattainable ; still it is right for Germans to declare at least their wish, that nothing may occur to prevent the future adherence of Belgium as a member of the German confederacy.

In every case, it is of the highest strategical moment to the German confederacy, that whenever they may be threatened with war by France, they should be able without difficulty to assume the military occupation of Belgium. On this account it is most desirable to encourage, by means of highways and railroads, a frequent commercial intercourse between the Belgians and the Rhenish Prussians, whose interests may be said to be in so many respects identical.

We are fully aware of the caution required of Germany to eschew any procedure, which, by indicating too high an estimation of Belgium, would be likely to give umbrage to Holland. The Germans have an affection for the Dutch, as a people of true German origin, who have proved themselves much

better qualified than the Belgians, to preserve their nationality from degrading foreign servitude. But an *enlarged policy*—if indeed the interests of Germany are to be decided according to such policy—imperatively demands that Germany should attach Belgium to herself, in preference to Holland. That Holland will be firm to Germany does not admit of doubt. She never can nor will resign herself to France. Under all circumstances she must remain the close ally of Germany against France. Belgium, on the other hand, is to be treated with the most wary and delicate tact. The security of Germany is perceptibly endangered by the ascendancy of French influence in Belgium. In order to withdraw Belgium from this influence; to gain her over to the interests of Germany; and make her a permanent and thoroughly effective bulwark against France; Germans cannot be sufficiently zealous and active. Even Holland herself can, as hitherto, be protected from the attempts of France solely by means of Belgium. If the policy to which Holland adheres, led to the neglect and abandonment of Belgium by the German confederacy, and her throwing herself unreservedly and exclusively

into the arms of France ; not only would Germany be thus deprived of her most important military frontier, but France would strike down Holland with the same blow.

We well remember, in the years 1814 and 1815, when many sagacious and patriotic Germans lamented the non-accomplishment of the reunion of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany ; they were met by the reply, that the kingdom of the Netherlands, and the strong fortresses on the Belgian frontier, were an ample protection,—that no French army of the Rhine would hazard an advance into Middle and Upper Germany, so long as Paris itself was threatened so closely from the German stronghold of Belgium. But how positions are now altered ! Five and twenty years have brought about an entire change. That stately kingdom of the Netherlands no longer exists. These strong fortresses, from which Paris was to be held in continual awe, were, in 1830, after the urgent entreaty of the Belgians for French assistance, opened amid the utmost rejoicing to the tricoloured flag. The auxiliary force was indeed obliged to march back

again ; but it may be asked, whether there is not cause for solicitude lest a visit to these fortresses may not perhaps at some time or other be repeated under circumstances more critical.

To Germany Belgium is of chief importance as a military frontier. But, in the next degree, the Belgian question affects the COMMERCIAL INTERESTS of Germany.

So much has already been written about the noted diplomatic phrase “*jusqu’ à la mer*” as applied to rivers, that we spare ourselves the trouble of repetition. It suffices to know, first, that immediately after the downfall of Napoleon and his Continental system, the free navigation to the North Sea was deemed one of the primary objects of the German Confederacy ; and its realization promised in the very document by which the Confederacy was established : secondly, that since that time, the necessity of an immediate communication with the sea, for the trade of Germany, has become every day more urgent : and lastly, that, by the formation of the Commercial League, an

authoritative advance has been made, which brings the German commerce effectually nearer to its maritime boundary. The commerce of Germany must now be directed either through Holland or Belgium ; if not through both. Each of these two countries possesses harbours on the sea, terminations of radii proceeding from the Commercial League as a centre.

With Holland Germany has negotiated long enough, and to no purpose. Holland will not open her ports to Germany ; unless under burdensome restrictions. Her grounds of objection are well known : being the same as those to which even the little Hamburg pretended, as a reason for not joining the Commercial League. Further, they are the exact grounds on which, at an earlier period, Spain legislated in regard to her South American, and England as respects her North American, Colonies.* Nevertheless, we may, from the instance of these Colonies, obtain a direct proof,

* There is very little resemblance between any impediments to the trade of the English Colonies, and the rigid prohibitions which were enforced in the Colonies of Spain.—*Tr.*

that Holland, for the sake of a very precarious advantage to her narrow commercial and colonial system, has neglected the much more solid benefits which an enlightened policy would have secured. For how did the petty Holland become so mighty? How was she able to acquire such splendid transmarine possessions? Merely by having, in the course of a century distinguished by great religious struggles, granted an asylum to the multitudes who flocked from Germany; thereby continually recruiting her exhausted population. By means of this influx of men, was she enabled to found these distant settlements. Her proud Amsterdam itself was nothing more than a colony; indebted for its extension, to the crowd of refugees whom the religious persecutions drove thither out of Germany, and also in smaller numbers from Franco. Holland thus became the emporium of German commerce.

Had not Holland at a later time secluded herself; had she fully considered what measures were to be adopted, for guiding along her canals the supernumerary population of Germany; had she always continued to associate the German interests with her

own; then would she have been empowered to maintain her colonies against England, and along with them the dominion of the sea.* Holland, as is well known, lost her colonies, because she had not men enough to defend them; remaining the small secluded Holland, and no longer the great outlet to the sea for the whole of Germany. Had the hundreds of thousands of Germans who have emigrated to North America, Poland, and Russia, gone over to the Dutch Colonies as to colonies essentially German; they would have been able to defy the English.† Holland disjoining her transmarine interests from the general interests of Germany; and though so inconsiderable a country, persisting in her attempts to execute, when opposed to England, what at no time could have been achieved, unless by all Germany and Holland combined; was the sole ori-

* From the unyielding valour displayed by the navy of Holland, her chance of success would certainly have been improved: but two conditions were requisite; namely, a permanence on the throne of England of such sovereigns as Charles II.; and a removal of the shoals on the Dutch coast, that her harbours might allow the entrance of first-rate ships of war.—Tr.

† If Holland could have defied the Portuguese, she would have retained a colony worth all those she lost to England.—Tr.

gin of the wretched decay now exhibited by her maritime and colonial power. If ever an Englishman should read this remark ; he must acknowledge its truth. We should regret if by any Hollander, or by any German, it were considered as futile.

Holland was satisfied with affixing the price of goods indispensable to Germany. Her views did not extend beyond this lucrative traffic. She never once inquired, whether there was a hope of perpetuating these advantages otherwise than by liberal and judicious regulations. She slighted the policy of the warrior and the statesman ; and preferred the craft of the small trader. She dealt out her wares and amassed wealth ; but took no thought of upholding and enlarging her maritime resources and foreign settlements, by means of continual accessions of people from the interior of Germany. Then were her fleets captured, and much the greater part of her colonies seized, by the English. One may ask, can she permanently retain the rest ?

That which it might have been possible for Ger-

many to effect in concert with Holland, is now since England and the United States of North America have secured the dominion of the sea, clearly no longer attainable; or at least not for centuries to come. It is vain for Germans to throw away anxiety about the formation of transmarine establishments for united Germany, rivalling the colonial supremacy of England. German solicitude ought rather to be turned to a combination of their divided strength for an object less remote;—the preventing a sacrifice of the greater for the profit of the less;—a vindication of the interest of the Commercial League against the opposing claims of Holland. England may ridicule this dispute: and while Germans along the course of the Rhine wrangle with other Germans at the mouth of the river; the English may continue their ridicule: as the Germans might, were the dwellers on the banks of the Thames engaged in a quarrel with their countrymen at the Nore.*

* The hindrance to an admission of colonial produce would seem to be not the only evil which has resulted from a closure of the Rhine. Information evidently is defective about the

We have on a former occasion asserted, and our opinion remains unchanged, that Holland will date her revival from the hour when she shall associate herself with the general interests of Germany. Not before then can her clipped wings resume their plumage. But it appears that Holland is still disposed to languish on her ancient but much curtailed heritage ; so long as the indulgence of England grants permission.* Notwithstanding the many able calculators throughout Holland ; never in a single instance have they yet proposed to themselves the questions;—Whether, as a country in the most intimate geographical and ethnographical connexion with Germany, Holland ought not to share the eminence which the industry and commerce of Germany have attained ? Whether there is nothing to gain ; more indeed than her due proportion, by choosing such a line of conduct ; and whether there is nothing to lose by a

amusements of the English, who take very little concern in the petty jealousies of their neighbours.—Tr.

* With perhaps less error, blame might have been imputed in another direction. The statement at page 160 regarding the influence to which Holland is now resigned will shew where.—Tr.

different decision, and allowing events to pursue their course? Events we would understand to signify, the acknowledgment of the German Commercial League at the harbours of the North Sea; which assuredly will sooner or later be conceded by Belgium, if not previously offered by Holland. Holland cannot evade the certainty of being a loser by some great concurrence of such events; when, feeble and inanimate, she will wistfully gaze on the fervid and vigorous progress of the extending traffic of Germany.

From the stubborn and recluse Holland, our attention is immediately drawn to Belgium. Since the two are now separated; the commerce of Germany must endeavour to acquire in Belgium what, up to this time, has in Holland proved to be unattainable. The negotiation is still pending. In the mean while we shall attempt to bring proof, that Germany ought to form engagements with Belgium, rather than with Holland; even though Holland were disposed to compliance, Holland certainly would at no time comply, on any other condition than the exclusion of Belgium from all

share of benefit. But to concede this point, would not only be injurious to the commercial welfare of Germany, but would likewise operate prejudicially on those more important military and political interests we have before examined. Belgium is indispensable to Germany; and she must be debarred from no participation which would be equally beneficial to both. Germany must not alienate the affections of Belgium, lest she be driven to espouse the cause of France—the main point in the Belgian question to be held in view by the statesmen of Germany. It would be most injudicious conduct to relinquish Belgium, in order to purchase the mercenary favour of Holland: while again, on the other hand, it is certain that, as soon as Belgium is open to German commerce; Holland will be powerless for harm, and probably will feel herself constrained to vie with Belgium in liberality. From Holland Germany can, with and through Belgium, obtain completely, what, unless to outbid Belgium, Holland never would freely grant.

There is further to be considered the favourable

situation of Belgium relatively to the Prussian frontier ; her internal opulence, and pre-eminent industry. The Germans, as a commercial people, would, as it were, cut off a right arm ; did they neglect these advantages which a union with Belgium would secure. Hence nothing is so much to be recommended, or to be desired ; as that every means should be employed for inducing Belgium to join her wealth, her youthful activity, and her splendid position, either directly or indirectly, with the extensive capital of the German Commercial League.

Only as third in order, though properly it ought to be the first ; we shall endeavour to explain the interest, German NATIONALITY has to uphold in the Belgian question. On this subject an unaccountable indifference prevails. They who are akin to Germans in language, in descent, and in the numberless minute features of character which distinguish nations from each other ; always have essentially a common interest with Germans ;—are their brethren and natural allies ; as has invariably been proved in times of danger. So widely

has the same speech extended ; and so forcibly does the same original character still predominate, the same sympathies, and the same antipathies. This brotherhood, a people ought never to renounce. They ought never to shew themselves unconcerned toward affinity of race and language ; nor look on tamely while a kindred people is overcome by a foreign race. National relationship ought to be viewed as an inherited fund ; a possession never to be thoughtlessly sacrificed, and with which an alien people ought on no account to be allowed to enrich themselves. The levity which would permit such a catastrophe, violates all the essential interests of nations ; nay, more, offends as a dereliction of national honour.

The smallest part only of Belgium is French or Walloon, the remainder is all German. Even now, beyond the small Walloon districts, the people speak a German dialect, not varying more from the written language of Germany than many diversities of tongue within the German Confederacy itself. A Fleming speaks as little high German as a Swiss or a Frieslander. Is he therefore less German

than they are? Still, the French minority in Belgium maintain a remarkable ascendancy over the German majority. In polite society French alone is spoken. The official language is French. The literature is a French literature. If the inferior classes were gradually to copy the higher; the German element in Belgium, notwithstanding its preponderance, would in the end be extinguished; and thus would the Belgians, as in their language, so also in their feelings, speedily become French. Such a change would indeed be a grievous loss and shame to the Germans as a people. The German language, sentiments, and culture, are surely not so barbarous that they must wane before what is termed French civilization.

Besides, Belgium was in ancient times highly celebrated for her contributions to German literature. Many of the most exquisite original compositions of the middle ages proceeded from Belgium. Vying with the poets of Upper Germany, the poets of the Netherlands composed ballads, and longer metrical works, in a profusion which is quite astonishing; though even yet they have

not all been brought to light. These ancient Swabian and Netherland bards sang in different dialects, but in a similar strain; their thoughts, their feelings, their minstrelsy alike. The two countries maintained the most lively intercourse. And are all these connexions to be finally dissolved? Shall the grandchildren, who on both sides still speak in a kindred tongue, no longer understand each other as their fathers did? Shall the rich, the contemplative, the intellectual Flanders and Brabant, where German act and German speech once flourished in such perfection, be now reduced to the insignificant rank of a French province? What would the old poets, painters, and architects say, who have bequeathed to these venerable Belgian towns their immortal works, were they to start from their graves, and find their proud homes desecrated by counterfeiters of tawdry Parisian taste?

It concerns German honour, that the Germanic population of Belgium should again take a share in the intellectual progress of Germany. But how can such participation result; if sympathy

between Germany and Belgium be not in every way fostered, if all paths be not opened which may lead them to each other? For promoting these objects; the friendly intercourse of men connected by similarity of language, will be much more effectual than warfare.

In this same national relation, Holland and Belgium exhibit a remarkable contrariety. The Dutch are a people of pure German stock; devout and upright; who will in no respect imitate strangers; who have never allowed themselves to be inveigled by Gallicism of phrase or of thought; whose character is quite unsophisticated. But they are—if Germans will admit the possibility—ultra German. Wrapped up in their self-willed provincialism, in no wise troubling themselves as to what may be the custom among those of kindred lineage, they display every true German fault to the highest degree. From other Germans they are as unwilling to learn any thing as they are from foreigners. The Belgians, on the contrary, are too little animated with national zeal; too susceptible of foreign impressions: like a little rough pebble

they have received the French polish. Where the Dutch are in excess, the Belgians are deficient.

But now, reverting to the national interests of Germany; we must again repeat, the Dutch will continue steadfast. Let the Germans then only take heed that the Belgians do not desert them.

So long as the Germans made no sort of inquiry about the peculiar nature of the Belgian population, and scarcely knew that any Germans existed in Belgium; so long as the German newspapers spoke of the Belgians as a foreign race, not entirely French, but at least an offset from France; there were evidently no hopes of rekindling the natural sympathies between the two branches of the German stem. The only wonder is that the Belgians were not attracted more irresistibly to France. In truth the Belgians are as much the children of Germany as the Germans are themselves; not as has been over hastily affirmed, lost, only neglected, children. Interest, honour, and duty, call on Germany to resume the fatherly

charge ; to feel for them as for brothers ; and to bring them back again to the paternal mansion. And now that the Belgians themselves are convinced of the necessity of leaning on Germany for support ; it appears the extreme of political negligence and guilt in the German nation scornfully to reject their advances.

Hitherto we have discussed the Belgian question altogether as affecting the general interests of Germany : it is fair that we should now consider the same question with especial reference to Belgium herself.

In the first place we assume, as an incontestable fact, that Belgium wishes to be *independent*. Belgium is independent, if not quite *de facto*, still *de jure*. She wishes to continue really so, in order to accomplish her own particular objects, to which the Dutch are hostile ; and because of her unwillingness to yield and sacrifice herself for the gratification of France. Her bias in favour of an unrestrained condition is grounded withal on bitter experience. Belgium passed through the ordeal of

the foreign dominion of Spain, to reach her municipal freedom. The more recent French sway led to the final attainment of her well-being. What Belgium requires, is to perfect the development of her immense internal wealth in a course of activity safe from all external hindrance. Belgium was by Spain condemned to the repose of the churchyard: a wild soldiery were let loose to transform her proud and industrious burghers into monks and mendicants; while Holland throve in liberty, in opulence, and refinement. Belgium was neglected and falsely treated by Austria: several times plundered, and finally swallowed up by France; stripped of the relics of her ancient splendour; estranged from her nationality; subjected to the detestable system of centralization, impoverishment, and conscription. On her last transference, she was again neglected and falsely treated by Holland, as she had before been by Austria;—a treatment the weak have too often endured from the strong, but never from those as weak as themselves. It is thus sufficiently manifest, why, after so severe trials, exemption from control is now the aim of Belgium. And has she not already, during

the short time she has been in the enjoyment of independence, fully availed herself of it, to produce an astonishingly rapid advancement of her material interests?

To Belgium all recollections of foreign dominion are blended with scenes of mourning and outrage. On the other hand, prosperity and renown distinguished the era of her independence. So long as Flanders and Brabant continued in the enjoyment of municipal and constitutional rights, under their own counts and dukes; and even under Burgundy till the time of Philip II.; their inhabitants surpassed all Europe in wealth, refinement, and intellectual culture. From thence Europe obtained her first lessons of well regulated freedom. The *Keuren* are the earliest authentic memoirs of any constitutional state in modern times. Here Western art first flourished;—painting and music before even in Italy they had gained estimation. Here was the great school of European industry. Splendour and taste were conjoined in all the productions of Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, Louvaine, Mechlin, and Brussels. Here also was the source

from whence the other nations of Europe derived their fashions. Even yet the traveller is astonished at the antique magnificence of the towns in the Low Countries. The whole of this architectural grandeur is to be ascribed to the period of freedom and immunity from foreign control.

When Belgium, justly mindful of her ancient renown, and of the inalienable rights with which her independence has been conjoined ; intent on holding inviolate, and guarding, these rights ; looks around to discover from what quarter they are menaced : unless utterly blind, she cannot fail to perceive that the vicinity of France is her most formidable danger. Holland is no longer strong enough to recover her ascendancy over Belgium. The union of Belgium with Holland was simply an experiment, made for the interests, and in obedience to the peremptory commands, of other powers quite distinct from Holland. As soon as the attempt failed, and it was clearly seen that the means adopted had not led to the desired end ; though the accomplishment of the end still continued in prospect ; the means were abandoned ; never to be again

employed. Little as Belgium has to fear from Holland in regard to her independence; she has still less cause of alarm from the German confederacy. Where there are so many adjoining States of various magnitude; a respect for a neighbour, however weak, has necessarily become an inherent principle of the league. Aggression does not in the least degree characterize the German confederacy, —throughout there is shewn no tendency to conquest: and a vital interest demands the protection of Belgian independence; because their conservative policy can never tolerate, that immediately westward, a restless power should be further enlarged at the expense of Belgium.

Consequently France alone threatens the security of Belgium. France has not, like the German confederacy, a defensive and conservative, but an aggressive vocation. She has been incessantly labouring for the extension of her frontiers; and aggrandizement will continue her invariable aim. Among all the objects on which she has directed, and ever will direct, her assaults, Belgium stands first; and any one endowed with military skill must

acknowledge, that the strategical importance of Belgium cannot be sufficiently appreciated, and ought never to be lost sight of.

Belgium has been laid under obligation by the powerful exertions of France to forward her disavowance from Holland. But it is clear that France has done so, only for her own peculiar objects, and not in the least from any feeling of generosity. Belgium maintains relations of friendship, with France. Her sovereign has married a daughter of the king of the French. Still a Belgian knows well himself how to distinguish such friendly ties from political subjection. Belgium has had abundant reason to know the felicity of being governed by French prefects. She will not, as a rich province, allow herself to be fleeced for the purpose of diminishing the exactions in the more needy provinces of France. She is not desirous to lose all that is peculiarly her own, her ancient celebrity, and her name; in order to come under that system of Gallic centralization, which is unwearied in the endeavour to assimilate all the provinces of the kingdom,—to efface every individual charac-

teristic,—and thus augment the solitary ostentation of Paris.

If any thing whatever can prove to the Belgians how advisable it is for them to lean more on Germany than on France ; it is the historical experience that in Germany, the peculiarity of the individual provinces has at all times been respected, that every province has been allowed to ameliorate its condition apart from the rest ; while in France, a tendency has ever been shewn to annihilate the local distinctions, and originality of the provinces. In Germany every individual race, nay, every individual tribe, has preserved its uncontrolled freedom : beyond the confederacy are Switzerland and Holland ; within the confederacy itself, the Confederate States, of which it is composed. Even in the larger German States, notwithstanding the Bureaucracy, which during the last century has predominated, and which would centralize every thing as in France ; along with a peculiarity of their physiognomies, a separate existence is maintained by each province, contrary to what is in France any where to be found. With regard to the Austrian

Empire, this quality of the German institutions is sufficiently known. But in Prussia, too, the recent introduction of provincial diets, has manifested that the more provinces a German state may acquire, the greater concessions to provincialism must be made from the system of centralization.

In Germany, nature has in so far always proceeded stedfastly in her usual course ; and though she may for a short time yield to violence, she always imperceptibly resumes her rights. But in France nature follows an opposite path : for which reason we thus would counsel the Belgians ;—Whoever among you desires to be associated with the dignity of France, indulge him ; but let him go and reside in Paris ; there he may solace himself with the enjoyments of a true Frenchman. In a province he would always have a melancholy part to play. But if you wish to remain a distinct nation ; and find that, by your own unassisted energy, you cannot effect your object ; seek a guarantee for your exemption from foreign sway, in that quarter only, where at all times, the independence of small states, the peculiar manners and customs

of individual provinces, have been thoroughly respected and defended ; that is to say, in Germany.

It is true that, under all possible circumstances, Belgium is shielded against usurpation on the part of France, by the political interests of the German and other powers, who can never consent to Belgium becoming French. But Belgium would be in still greater safety, were she to cement a close union with Germany. The more ambiguous the position of the small states between Germany and France ; the greater was at all times their peril from French invasion. Lorraine, Burgundy, Flanders, Liege, Treves, had ever more cause to regret their alliances with France, than their adherence to the German Empire. As often as amicable relations were entered into with France ; a claim was subsequently advanced by the French, who enforced their mere claim as a customary right ; and finished in every instance by taking possession of the weaker country. On the side of Germany these small frontier states were never endangered ; they were rather upheld in their undisturbed freedom. If, in the calamitous period of general disorder, this

support sometimes proved inadequate ; still, on the return of prosperity, it always became again effectual. Oftener than once has Belgium been rescued by German aid, from the armies and the governors of France ; and even at the present moment, Belgium owes her exemption from dependence on France, to the German battalions who delivered her in the year 1813.

Let us now proceed from the question of individual existence, to the MATERIAL INTERESTS of Belgium ; and we shall find, that with a view to these interests, Belgium requires just as much the support of the German Commercial League, as it must be the object of the league itself to reach the sea through Belgium. The reason is, that Belgium, unaided, has not the means to avail herself of her geographical position, for augmenting her transmarine commerce ; in the same degree she might, were her endeavours seconded and protected by the interest and power of the Commercial League of Germany. The jealousy of a neighbour, the more sensitive from holding the command of the

sea, is the obstacle Belgium has to encounter.* She must add to her strength from the countries in her rear. The more the powers occupying the inland parts of Germany shall be affected by restraints on Belgian commerce; the more will Belgium herself be in a condition to brave such restraints. As in political, so also in commercial relations, Germany is the natural ally of Belgium.

Besides, so preponderating is the industry of Belgium; that, in case of her adhesion to the German Commercial League, she would less be exposed to rivals, than gain a far more extensive market for her productions. But to the States who have already adopted the League, the competition of Belgian industry would be counterbalanced by the advantage of a right of way to the sea. In fact, by means of Belgium, the theory which constitutes the foundation of the Commercial League, would be

* Said neighbour, according to the avowed opinion of her most enlightened statesmen, in the last as well as the present age, flourishes not by the poverty but the opulence of adjacent countries.—TR.

proved in the clearest manner. With a view to the material interests of both the contracting parties, her adhesion unquestionably is not desirable alone, but obligatory ; and unless by considerations of a nature altogether different, it could not have been so long prevented.

Belgium, therefore, on grounds political and commercial ; in so far as she would uphold her independence, and gain the utmost extension for her industry and trade ; is guided to Germany as her natural ally : and there is just as little doubt, that, in regard to her national interests likewise, she must still cling to the same support.

The Belgians cannot escape from obedience to that general law of nature, which imposes on the off-sets of every people the duty of holding fast by their primary stem. No collateral branch of any nation can ever, with impunity, renounce their inborn character, or their hereditary speech. The history of the Belgians themselves is the best voucher for what we now affirm. The German population of that country never, unless with great detriment, suc-

cumbed to the influence of foreigners. Did Belgium enjoy prosperity when under the rule of the Spaniards; when she assumed the Spanish garb, language, and sentiments, and yielded to Spanish institutions; unnerved and degraded by intolerance, the Inquisition, and tyranny? Was Belgium fortunate when, at a later period, she became subject to France; endured the pillage of the hungry Sans-culottes; was then overrun by a host of French soldiers and civilians, and infected with every sort of demoralizing agency? Even yet does this bi-formed influence of exotic nationalities continue to operate in Belgium. Even yet are these two foreign elements perpetually thrusting themselves forward, and repressing the original Germanic element. There still exists among the clergy a vestige of the Spanish temper; and still, in the libels and *emeutes*, a tinge of the old French Jacobinism. Still the ghost of Granvelle prolongs its wandering through the streets of the venerable towns in search of the ghost of Pacheco.

Belgium was happy, only while, in possession of her ancient constitutional and municipal freedom,

she cultivated and spread afar the public spirit and the arts of Germany. Instead of being ashamed of her German language and modes of thought; much more were they to her a subject of pride, in those days to which are referred all the high recollections of the Netherlands. The unhappiness of Belgium was confined to the period of her subjugation and estrangement.

“ The wellbeing of a people consists not in their assimilation to what is foreign, but in the proper development of their own national character.” Under every circumstance, this law of nature is confirmed; and exceedingly beneficial would it be for Belgium, did her repressed Germanic element again come forward with energy. Such is the feeling among the Belgians themselves. They have begun to entertain a lively remembrance of the olden time; and every page of their ancient history, of the monuments of their language, tells them they are German. Whenever they shall know, in all its extent, the share their fathers took in the mental culture of Germany; doubtless the national sympathy will act with greater keenness.

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And why should not at last the noble ambition reanimate them, of becoming connected with the Germans of the present day, as their forefathers were with an earlier generation ?

The first thing necessary, is to restore the ancient literature of Belgium. Let the Belgians begin by learning to appreciate these remains. When they shall thus have acquired a due sense of their old German nationality ; they will proceed with eagerness to examine into the intellectual development of Germany in their own time. They will retrieve what, since the Spanish ascendancy, has been neglected. They will not fail to understand and admire, like other Germans, those works of German philosophy and taste, so perfectly congenial to their own thoughts and feelings ; but which have remained hitherto screened from their view by a superficial Gallic refinement. Such, we doubt not, will be the actual, because it is the natural, termination. Yet fain would we have it come to pass early enough to enable many true Belgians, who zealously uphold their country's interest, to become aware of this mode of effecting their ob-

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ject, and join in the endeavour for promoting the extension of German literature in Belgium.

The Belgians have in this respect an advantage over the Dutch ; possessing an ancient provincial literature ; but now, at least, very insignificant traces of modern authorship. Hence they may, with much greater facility, adopt the literature of a kindred nation. The provincial jealousy of the Dutch will long resist any introduction of the general literature of Germany : among the Belgians the case is different. Their written language is French. But as they have become more conscious of their independence ; they must allow the German element to reassume its natural rights. The Belgians would encounter no small obstructions in imitating the example of the Dutch, and writing Flemish, as the Dutch write their Holland's dialect. They must employ the classical German, and will probably, sooner than the Dutch ; unless nature shall deviate from her regular course, and the 19th and 20th centuries be unreasonably guided by the precedent of the 17th and 18th.

The spread of the language of France in countries originally German, is manifestly unnatural. So long as the higher ranks in Germany admitted the prevalence of the French language, the just development of the nation was stationary ; rendering indispensable some violent reaction, to banish the foreign intruder from the land, and re-establish the genuine character of the people on its own basis. How, when throughout Germany, the French tongue had become predominant ; when the common people had shared the delirium of the higher ranks ;—can anything be imagined more revolting, than that the noble nationality of Germany, her language, and her literature, should disappear from the European soil ? But that which as a whole would have been unjustifiable, why should it be attempted to justify in part ? For the old German population of Belgium to cease to be German, would be in no degree less ignominious to them, than for the whole of the other Germans to relinquish their nationality.

But in the end, Belgium has only a choice between the unnatural transmutation of becoming

French, and the opposite course of associating herself with the general literature of Germany. The sphere of German literature is in a state of progressive enlargement toward its rightful limits; absorbing within itself all separate and provincial literatures. Three hundred years ago, the written language of Switzerland was Swiss; of Pomerania, the Pomeranian dialect. These dialects have now fallen into disuse. Holland alone withstands, and with injury to herself, the great law of assimilation. Nature would seem to prescribe, that in writing, one general language should prevail; but that the provincial speech may be retained unaltered, and appropriated to colloquial discourse. Such is the happy example afforded by Switzerland. Politically independent; maintaining her provincial peculiarity of language and usages in all their ancient integrity; she has yet conjoined herself with the great national literature of Germany. Herein the benefit has been mutual. Swiss rank among the highest of German reasoners and poets; among the mighty in German philosophy and art; yet do they ever remain free and independent Switzers. Would

not such a relation be also the most natural for Belgium?

Perhaps it is not altogether superfluous here to add a remark, which likewise has reference to the subject of Material Interests already examined. The distinguished industry of Flanders and Brabant has all along been exclusively attributable to their Germanic origin and public spirit. In France, with a licentious feudal nobility, and under kings who always aspired to autocracy, this old German spirit lay hid. Industry and commerce never ventured on so bold a course. Even yet the blessing of civic assiduity and wealth rests on the nations of Teutonic origin,—the Germans, Swiss, Dutch, English, and North Americans; nor can the French, Italians, and Spaniards compare with these nations.

All countries where a Romanic tongue is spoken, have a disposition to concentrate their activity, their wealth, and their renown; in courts, councils, and armies. The people throughout their provinces are, in the mass, nowhere so industrious,

wealthy, and civilized ; nay, they are not, in any instance, possessed of so much civic freedom ; as the inhabitants of the towns and districts where the Teutonic languages prevail. Accompanying these languages, nationality exerts a decided influence. In regard to material interests, therefore, it is not an unimportant circumstance to what country we belong ; or to what national speech, habits, and manner of thought we have been familiarized. Under Spain, together with her old German public spirit, Belgium lost that opulence which she had derived from her industry. Holland, on the other hand, remaining German, was able to secure those advantages her neighbour had forfeited. In America, the Anglo-Saxon population has, with Teutonic perseverance, steadily pressed forward, both against the French Louisiana and the Spanish Texas : while among the Romanic population of Europe, this perseverance, this steadiness, and civic energy, are not less found wanting. To Gallicize Belgium therefore, is to subvert her industry. To revive the Germanic feeling of Belgium, is to invigorate her skill, and lead her to a boundless duration of prosperity and renown.

The whole of these considerations ought to impress Germans with an eager solicitude, that every thing be done, on the part of the Confederacy, to win Belgium to German interests, and teach her to meet cheerfully the advances of a kindred race.

Austria, on strategical grounds, must desire that in every war which may ensue between Germany and France, Belgium should enlist on the side of Germany, and remain her foremost bulwark against France. Prussia, too, for commercial objects, must seek a closer union with Belgium: and the Minor States collectively, are interested in setting up between France and the larger powers, an additional confederate; to increase their number and political weight, and afford another guarantee of their future independence.

Prussia, it may be argued, has no interest in fostering sympathies between the Catholics of Belgium and those of her Rhenish provinces; at least not while she remains entangled with ecclesiastical disputes. But, according to our opinion, statesmen who adopt an enlarged policy, may

slight the apprehensions created by journalists and pamphleteers, and even partial movements in favour of the church ; when counterbalanced by the proved and stedfast affections of the majority of the people. We believe that sound knowledge and toleration ; the habitual enjoyment of religious freedom ; the control of fashion ; and especially the guidance of material interests ; are far more effective than the outcry of church parties. Finally, it is our conviction, that the sterling worth of that neutral influence in society, which regards church squabbles with perfect unconcern, would be greatly strengthened ; were a fresh impulse given to the material interests of Germany, by a commercial union with Belgium. In truth a more effectual diversion could hardly be imagined against these trifling contentions, which are so thoroughly opposed to the real welfare of the kingdom. Nothing is so likely to withdraw men from a strife so perfectly useless, and to engage their attention in promoting objects of general advantage.

And have not the statesmen of Germany already had some experience as to the degree of excite-

ment which may be quelled by advancing the material interests of the people ? Prohibitions, censorship, even armed force, were brought into action, to suppress the movements which took place in consequence of the July revolution. These remedies did not, however, sooth public irritation ; they did not tear from the passions their concealed sting, nor introduce a new and unwonted feeling of contentment. No negative, but positive measures only, could bring about that wished for result ; it could not arise unless from the Commercial League. Statesmen who zealously act on an enlarged policy, are sure to overcome the prejudices and the virulence of narrow politicians : by studying to forward the essential interests of the community ; they will always have the community on their side, and will triumph over *party*. Ultramontanism has given check to the king : a move against the queen ;* the advance of German commerce to Ostend ; would, more certainly than any thing else, compel Ultramontanism to retreat.

It is incontrovertible that, bringing under view

* What queen ?—TR.

objects beneficial and salutary to the whole nation, is far more praiseworthy than embittering party hatred. May therefore a preference be shewn for measures corresponding with the public interests at large, and which, as the German Commercial League has proved, never fail to operate with a magical power. A measure of a perfectly similar kind would be the annexation of Belgium to the confederate interests of Germany.*

SWITZERLAND has altered her government in consequence of the July revolution; clearly indicating how very susceptible she still is of impressions from France. Had another result been produced by the July revolution;—instead of the inauguration of a new dynasty, had the plans of the Republican and War party been successful: the new governments in Switzerland would, in the great movement, have infallibly been carried

* In a note here appended, the author intimates that the preceding investigation of Belgian affairs had been extracted from his literary journal, on account of its bearing on that important question; but chiefly because of the earnest wish therein expressed, still remaining unfulfilled.

along with, and would have become dependent on, France ; like the Helvetic Government in the time of the Directory and Napoleon. Meanwhile the opposite party gained the ascendant. The new Governments of Switzerland came unexpectedly into collision with the King of the French about the adventure of young Louis Napoleon.* Calmness returned. From 1798 to 1814, the Swiss had suf-

* This young prince has now learnt by experience, that it is not enough merely to personate Napoleon ; but that it is necessary to be a second Napoleon in order to reach Napoleon's greatness. As the genuine "*princeps juventatis*" of young Europe, he advanced the most extraordinary claims, founded, as the event proved, on no sort of merit of his own. Where men have halted, after the most fearful exertions ; there would these striplings resume the enterprise ; not with steady labour, but with money in hand ; not at the starting post, but at the goal.

When the prince failed in the part of a hero, he recommenced as a radical : and shortly after produced a pamphlet, in which he roundly asserts that popular freedom was the sole aim of Napoleon ; who assumed the crown, and introduced a despotic form of government, for no other reason than to further the establishment of republican institutions ; and that his apparently insatiable thirst for conquests, was merely for the purpose of emancipating the European nations, and rendering them independent of each other. Yet the speculation of a prince so foolishly credulous as the pamphlet testifies him to be, was not altogether ill devised : for there are many people in western Europe, who enjoy this spirituous extract of Beranger's

ferred too much from France, to admit of their desiring the renewal of a French protectorate.

But why did not the German Confederacy in some way avail themselves of the occurrence of the Swiss dispute with France. A greater approach to fellowship with the Confederacy would be advantageous to both parties. An abolition of the custom-houses on the Swiss frontiers, together with an equitable and friendly alliance between the University of Zurich and the German universities; seem to be the measures through which the interests of Switzerland may gradually become identified with those of the Confederacy. The influence of France in Switzerland can be permanently counteracted, only by an equal participation in the advantages of free trade; and by the diffusion of German culture, literature, and science.

songs, and become doubly intoxicated with the glories of the revolution and of the Empire.*

* With a little deviation from the unities of time and place; the Boulogne farce was an apt sequel to the theatrical effort at Strasburg.—TÆ.

SCANDINAVIA.

SINCE the Danish fleet was destroyed, and Sweden lost her hold of Finland, Scandinavia has languished in a condition singularly inconspicuous. Yet it must not be imagined that in this rude climate national vitality has altogether disappeared. The Teutonic race—to which the Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians belong—are endued with remarkable steadfastness of character. They may pause and slumber ingloriously for a time, but their innate worth is not extinguished ; and sooner or later they awake to fresh proofs of vigour and magnanimity.

The actual position of these kingdoms is certainly unfavourable. In maritime strength they are

surpassed by England ; and on land Russia is predominant. Matched with such powers, the weakness of Denmark and Sweden cannot involve a reproach. Still in truth, for their progressive decline, they have partly themselves to blame ; as, during a period when they were still mighty, they, in the most inconsiderate manner, warred against and enfeebled each other,—for the ultimate advantage of their grasping neighbour Russia. Not without Danish assistance did Peter the Great triumph over Sweden, and gain possession of her provinces on the Southern Shore of the Baltic. Had the union of the dynasties at Kalmar, produced an amalgamation of the people ; that union would have endured, and been the means of founding for the whole of Scandinavia, an energetic instead of a tottering throne. In such case, it is most likely, St Petersburg would never have been built.

Recollections so depressing ought at least to teach the Scandinavians of the present day, that their mutual contentions and jealousies become alike unprofitable to both.

If Denmark and Sweder do not henceforward go hand in hand with relation to their external policy, it is little to be doubted that their ill fortune will remain unchanged. Should they both persist in adhering to opposite European parties, necessarily one of the two must again incur a penalty. But every detriment sustained by the one, is really injurious to the other; since only when the two are combined, do they enjoy any importance, or exhibit a power which will be held in consideration by Europe. Denmark and Sweden are nearly in the same circumstances as the Minor Confederate States of Germany. Neither of the two can be a gainer when the other loses; because what is lost by either of them, is ultimately a deprivation to the political system of which both are components.

In every event, Germany is the most natural ally of the Scandinavian kingdoms. Only by Germany, can they be protected against the machinations and further encroachments of Russia. Only by means of an intimate connexion with Ger-

many, can they, after a time, be placed in a situation to retrieve the advantages of which England has deprived them.*

* Certainly by no appropriation of Baltic territory. Nor will the peril of Scandinavian independence "come over the salt sea."—TR.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

THE affairs of Spain and Portugal have not much weight in the European scale. These countries have with justice been esteemed as merely subordinate in rank ; though their importance has, perhaps, been somewhat undervalued. A benevolent commiseration for the noble and unfortunate inhabitants of the beautiful Peninsula, is not on that account diminished. Yet as we are treating of general policy alone, we can bestow no more than a transient regard on the South-Western extremity of Europe.

..
An augmentation of Spanish strength would not tend to promote the views of France, because thus France might soon find herself in troublesome neighbourhood. Neither would an improvement

of the warlike resources of Spain be advantageous to England; since Spain might become, if not an equal, yet, in the Mediterranean at least, a harassing naval power.*

A revival of Spanish greatness is adapted only to the schemes of Russia, in order that Spain may be employed against England; or is conducive to the objects of Austria, Prussia, and the rest of Germany, that there may be raised up for them a more efficient ally against France. But these powers are too far distant from the Peninsula: and if England or France thought themselves in the least danger from such attempts of the potentates in the east of Europe, they have already guarded against them, by encouraging and maintaining the ascendancy of Constitutional principles in Spain as well as in Portugal.

* Hardly a ground for national jealousy, unless there were no other naval power in the Mediterranean.—Tr.

ITALY.

As Spain is a volcano which has been long burning; Italy, on the other hand, is a volcano which has been long burnt out.* If we compare the situation of Italy and of the East; we cannot fail to perceive that the whole southern half of Europe is in utter decay. The dominion of the world has completely changed. Formerly it proceeded from the south; now it has come northward.

The only influence which Italy at present exerts on Northern Europe, is through the Papal Court:—an influence by no means beneficial to the Italians themselves; nor does it in these latter days guarantee the old supplies. That broad stream of

* Perhaps only smouldering, like Vesuvius before Pliny's time.—*TR.*

gold, which at an earlier time poured over the Alps, has become a slender rill, less lucrative to the pontifical Romans than the visits of the heretic English. The States of the Church are needy, and their hunger is fed by freethinkers.

The political importance of Italy is, in truth, confined to her remaining the apple of discord between Austria and France. For centuries have these two powers been constantly renewing their struggles for Italian predominance. But the House of Hapsburg has always maintained the upper hand, and holds it still.

Germany, or whatever government takes the lead in Southern Germany, is necessitated to preserve the absolute command of Italy; so long as France endeavours to approach in that direction, either with the view of seizing Italy itself, or of gaining a clearer line for operations against Germany. It is proper to notice, that the founder of the House of Hapsburg relinquished Italy; leaving her exempt from all German interference, under the authority of her native rulers. His suc-

cessors, however, felt themselves compelled to recross the Alps and drive out the French. They were, further, obliged to occupy Northern Italy permanently; else the French would have confirmed their superiority in that quarter, and have kept the German empire in perpetual dread of attack.

..

THE EAST.

THE East here presents itself to our view, merely as a large object; about which the European powers, though guided by their several interests, are all conjointly occupied. It is now long since the series of events in the history of mankind, forming the reaction of Western Christendom against the Mahometan world, has been prepared and begun. In this reaction the great powers have all participated, Prussia alone indirectly. Russia has conquered in Turkey and in Persia. France has, at Algiers, resumed the projects she was unable to execute at the time of her Egyptian expedition. England, advancing beyond the Indus, has already assailed the Mahometan coalition in the rear; and from her rocky strongholds in the Mediterranean, exerts herself to establish the shortest thorough-

fare to her Eastern dominions. Austria, at an earlier period the chief antagonist of the Ottomans, who suffered the most from their attacks, who the most perseveringly, and with the greatest sacrifices, warred against the Porte; Austria, to whom Europe, in this respect, is under the deepest obligation, has, nevertheless, gained no recent accessions of territory in the East; having not even recovered Belgrade which she once possessed; and having permitted Russia to move on, and intercept her communication with the mouths of the Danube. Still less has been the share of Prussia. The German States, also—collectively—have, with regard to the Eastern question, been left at disadvantage, in comparison with the chief Romanic and Slavonic States; though Constantinople is further removed from Petersburg and Paris, and from London too, than from Vienna and Berlin. No doubt Germany gained an advanced station in Greece, when an illustrious prince of the ancient German house of Wittelbach was elevated to the throne of Athens; but this classic sovereignty is indeed feeble.

All that has yet taken place in the East,—the

reaction of Western Christendom, extensive as it already has become,—seems only the prelude to a great historical drama, for which mankind have been many years gazing in eager expectation.

Before we proceed to consider the individual interests by which the great European powers are actuated with relation to Oriental affairs, may it be allowed to examine the question on its general bearings.

The Mahometan nations appear no longer to possess the vitality, or creative energy, requisite for withstanding the pressure of the arms and civilization of Western Europe. Even the great Agitator in Egypt, who but the other day shook the throne of the Padishah, owes his main success to those reforms which, while vying with the Sultan, he carried more dexterously into execution. He might no doubt retain the turbans and variegated robes discarded by his superior; yet the Mahometan people themselves could not have been really persuaded that they were to look to the Egyptian for a revival of their ancient usages. If

Mahommed Ali had seriously engaged in a regeneration of the old heroic times of Islam ; if there had blazed forth in the East a general fanaticism so excited ; then infallibly would the Pasha of Egypt with his reforms have been offered up as the first victim. But nowhere does there seem to be left any moral strength for such an effort. Mahomedanism has outlived itself.

Nothing besides the mutual jealousy of the great Western powers, gives a respite of pitiable existence to the national system of the Mussulmans. Did these powers, acting in concert, march at once against the East, they would speedily amend the failure of the Crusades, by the overthrow of the now decrepit realms of Saladin. But eventually this demolition must take place ; either by a combined assault of Christendom, or by one of the Western powers having the good fortune to be before the rest in seizing the ample prize.

The continuance of the East for another century in its present condition, is just as unlikely as that there should be a violent regeneration of the Ma-

hometan people. Even though Russia allow herself to be withheld from further conquests, by a diplomatic combination like that which dictated the treaty of Adrianople; still England cannot give up the plan of striking out for herself the highest way to India, through the centre of the Mussulman territories; and is not the accomplishment of this scheme, with regard to material interests, an essential concern of the whole West of Europe? The more extensive the inquiries, and the greater the amount of information collected, regarding material interests in general; the more imperatively will the enforcement of the nearest and most secure route to India, be demanded not by England alone, but by all the westward European nations.

Notwithstanding, the final decision may long be unattainable; and the provisional state, though under frequent modifications, may yet continue for some time in the Levant. Russia cannot move forward without alliances, which are beyond her reach. England is placed in the same difficulty.*

* Not altogether; especially as the object of her movements is not spoliation.—Tr.

Prussia alone can determine the result, according as she may throw her weight into the scale. But Prussia seems to have cause for avoiding a hasty resolution ; and from her pacific bias, will study to maintain the tranquillity of Europe.

England feels herself urgently impelled to strengthen her influence in the Levant, for the purpose of forming and defending an overland passage to India. The object of Russia, if not to prosecute her long course of southern aggrandizement, undoubtedly is to impede the English route, and weaken the naval power of England in the Mediterranean. The hopes of France rest on employing the jealousy of these two powers, according to circumstances ; always holding herself in readiness to seize any available opportunity for consolidating and enlarging the settlements she already occupies on the Mahometan soil, and to stretch across from Africa to Asia. The safety of Austria depends on not allowing Russia to encroach farther southward ; consequently Austria and England have an interest perfectly similar. France may go over from the English to the Russian alliance, exactly as suits her views, and as the

chances turn. But without Prussia, Russia is incapable of venturing on hostilities with Austria and England ; nor can Austria without Prussia, let herself be pushed forward by England against Russia. The presence of Mr Von Muffling at Adrianople was in this respect very significant. Such was then, is, and will continue to be, the policy of Prussia. She may, on eastern affairs, resolve as she pleases, or decline any resolution whatever.*

Though, as we anticipate, the great Oriental question may not be speedily determined ; another subject of inquiry still remains. Joining in the European struggle for political principles, is quite the reverse of participation in a rivalry about opposite interests. The surest means of allaying the one contest are to be derived from the other ; but one of the two must ever be in progress. Discussions regarding internal policy and constitutional reforms, even disputes on matters of religion, cease exclusively to engage the people as well as the go-

* Most enviable Prussia!

vernments, whenever great questions of interest, of war, and of alliances, are brought forward. But as soon as attention is withdrawn from external policy, domestic affairs necessarily come again into notice, and the strife of hostile principles is resumed with greater eagerness.

The importance of this consideration cannot be overlooked by any government which has more to fear than to hope from internal quarrels. But the power which has least to apprehend on that ground, will not fail in obtaining most advantage from a vigilant study of the Eastern crisis.

Our last observation is, Since the age in which we live is an age of events; so, according to the natural course of things, again—at an appointed period—the arrangements now existing will undergo change. The rising generation, habituated, under diplomatic guardianship, to a long peace, has hardly any conception of the scenes witnessed and endured by the generation which preceded them. But this oblivious feeling,—this indifference to the blessings

of tranquillity,—this uneasiness,—this thoughtless and petulant longing for greater and more striking realities, and this ignorance of all their attendant horrors,—are preparing for Europe another age of marvels. The longer the transition is postponed, the fewer may be left of the older men, who, having been tried in severe misfortunes, lean to the continuance of the peace now maintained, by the prudent agency of statesmen, and by the material interests of the people ;—the greater will be the augmentation of that electric vehemence, with which the very atmosphere of the present time is charged.

Then will they be the gainers who find their enemy's station defenceless ; and they the losers who are taken unawares. Security will depend on forethought, a consolidation of natural alliances, and a judicious advancement of kindred interests. Whoever permit the elevation, increase, or coalition of hostile powers to obtain the ascendant ; besides phlegmatically, thoughtlessly, and suspiciously, neglecting to invite union where interests are alike, and to encompass themselves with natural

alliances ; or, by a fluctuating policy, waste time, and excite general mistrust ; will have sufficient opportunities to rue their negligence. If, likewise, all animation should become extinct among the people, and the revolutionary principle seem to be obliterated ; so much the more certainly will the initiative of some great movement proceed from a cabinet policy, which, with boldness and intelligence, has well calculated its objects, and insured to itself the aid of the strongest alliances : for it is written, Eternal peace is not to be hoped for in this life ; but only Hereafter.

POSTSCRIPT.

The year 1840 is past. It has exhibited to our contemplation novel and unlooked for scenes. England and Russia have become reconciled, for the purpose of arranging, in alliance with Austria and Prussia, the complicated affairs of the East;—that is to say, with the hope of substituting one provisional condition for another; since a definitive settlement of the Oriental question is still very far from being realized. It is true, they have taken Syria from the Egyptian Pasha, designing its restitution to the Sultan: and, in this course of procedure, they have shewn little deference toward France,—that loud-talking France, who lavished on the Pasha her unprofitable advice, promising assistance, and granting him none; who menaced so boldly the Four Powers, yet proved so reluctant

to fulfil her threats ; whose preparations for war were on so enormous a scale as to rouse all Germany ; but whose ministers again so hastily adopted a pacific language.—The bones of Napoleon, personifying the demon of war, had been conveyed into Europe from their distant tomb ; but the icy blast of the Beresina, reappearing at the final ceremony, chilled the martial ardour so fiercely grandiloquent, and evoked new oblations on the altar of Peace.

Still, in regard to interest and intentions, nothing is changed. Powers reciprocally hostile have coalesced for a short time, in order to frustrate the plans of a third Power which was obnoxious to all. But these are mere demonstrations, and do not represent the actual bearing of the several Powers. England and Russia are, and must remain, the great opponents. Yet why should Russia have engaged in her recent alliance with England, since she cannot profit thereby ? Is it not that she is benefited through the disagreement which has taken place between England and France ? She would have been still more a gainer, if France and

Germany had been involved in a war with each other. The more the rest of Europe are at variance, the greater the satisfaction of Russia.

But should peace continue, the planets will rapidly assume a different aspect. We have, within no very long space of time, seen an alternation of a Western and an Eastern quadruple alliance, composed of very heterogeneous elements ;—evinced how much the English diplomacy excels the diplomacy of the Continent. But the one alliance is as unlikely to endure as the other. As soon as the operation of the cause ceases, the effect must also terminate. If France give way, the Quadruple Alliance no longer serves any purpose ; and even though France should maintain her warlike attitude, the Alliance must undergo important modifications ; since unfortunately it is not to be questioned, that the German Powers would, without hesitation, be left to sacrifice themselves for the others in a war against France. Yet these same German Powers, should heaven grant them the victory, would find the most active exertions employed, to

grudge and lessen the advantages it ought to yield them.

There are artful combinations of policy which can convert friends into foes, and enmity into friendship; and which may produce alterations in the real views, as in the natural interests of states. But these combinations of policy resemble only transient disturbances of the magnetic needle: When the interruption is removed, the needle points the more steadily in its proper direction.

STUTTGARD, 20th December 1840.



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